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Abstract 
 
The Minister for Health claims savings of €600 million due to the 2016-2020 framework 
agreement (the Agreement) with the Irish Pharmaceutical Healthcare Association. But 
relative to what? No agreement. That seems implausible since such State/industry 
agreements have been in operation continuously since 1969.  Furthermore the State has 
powers to set medicine prices under the Health (Pricing and Supply of Medical Goods) Act 
2013? Agreed, but what would be a more appropriate counterfactual?  The status quo: 
replicating the 2012-2015 agreement and extending its length for one year. That seems a 
sensible credible alternative. But what would the savings be if the status quo is the 
counterfactual? €290 million. Wow, less than half the Minister’s estimate. But won’t that 
make the Health Service Executive (HSE)’s task in deciding which new high cost medicines to 
fund much harder? Yes.  Perhaps the HSE should set out guidance as to when a new 
medicine will be funded, with, for example, an upper cost-effectiveness limit. But surely the 
methodology and assumptions underlying the Minister’s claimed savings are published, as 
part of a transparent, open evidenced based policy? Afraid not. Why?  Good question. This 
paper attempts, albeit partially, to fill the void in the analytics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The latest in a long series of pharmaceutical pricing agreements for medicines supplied to 
the public health system in Ireland commenced on 1 August 2016. The “Framework 
Agreement the Supply and Pricing of Medicines” (the Agreement) will apply until 31 July 
2020.1  The signatories on behalf of the buyers of medicines for the State are the 
Department of Health (DoH), the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER) and 
Health Service Executive (HSE).2 The signatory on behalf of sellers of medicines is the Irish 
Pharmaceutical Health Association (IPHA), which represents manufacturers of patent-
protected medicines in Ireland.3  
 
The comprehensive Agreement is twenty five pages in length. It applies to new medicines, 
existing patent-protected medicines and medicines that have lost exclusivity, including both 
biologics and biosimilars. The Agreement influences medicine pricing in four principal ways: 
the appraisal process for new medicines, including the timelines for appraisal and a 
decision-making authority cost-effectiveness threshold/net budget impact matrix; 
international reference price rules and realignment arrangements for existing medicines 
with exclusive supply; price reductions for patent-expired medicines upon loss of exclusive 
supply, which vary between non-biologic (i.e. generics) and biologic medicines (i.e. 
biosimilars); and, rebates. 
 
The Agreement was welcomed by the Minister for Health, who stated it will result in savings 
of €600 million; “the pricing provisions ... represent a significant improvement on those 
contained in the previous agreement”; and, will “ensure that Irish patients continue to have 
access to new and innovative medicines and that Ireland remains in the forefront of its 
                                                     
1
 The Agreement may be accessed at: http://health.gov.ie/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Framework-
Agreement-on-the-Supply-and-Pricing-of-Medicines-signed-copy.pdf. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
2
 In addition the Office of Government Procurement (OGP) was also involved in the negotiations (DPER, 2016, 
p. 26).  
3
 According to its website the IPHA “represents the international research based pharmaceutical industry in 
Ireland.” http://www.ipha.ie/alist/about-us.aspx. Accessed 23 May 2017.  A list of the IPHA members that are 
signatories to the Agreement is contained in Schedule 2 of the Agreement. 
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European peers in terms of early access to medicines in an affordable manner within 
available resources.”4   
 
There was no public consultation on the draft agreement or key aspects such as the cost-
effectiveness threshold, measured using a Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY), or the trade-off 
between early access to a new medicine and the likely higher price. Other pharmaceutical 
representative bodies do not appear to have been consulted.  Apart from one unpublished 
table detailing the composition of the savings,5 the underlying analysis of the impact of the 
Agreement has not been released.6 There is, however, published research commissioned by 
the DoH/HSE to inform the State in its negotiations leading to the Agreement.7  
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical appraisal of the Agreement and associated 
savings claims.  More specifically, this analysis addresses the two questions. (i) How credible 
are the claims of the savings due to the Agreement? (ii) Does the Agreement offer an 
improvement in achieving value for money over the previous agreement, which ran from 
2012 to 2015?8 However, before addressing these questions it is necessary to provide some 
background to the Agreement.  
BACKGROUND 
Medicine Expenditure: Trends and Who Pays 
The vast majority of medicines in Ireland are paid for by the State through general taxation.9  
Nominal expenditure on State funded community drug schemes has increased in for each 
                                                     
4
 Department of Health (2016, p. 1).  There were also unspecified and unquantified additional savings from 
“non-IPHA companies.” However, subsequently the Minister put a figure of €150 million on these savings, but 
with no indication as to what they refer and how they were estimated (Harris, 2016).  Hence we do not 
consider these unspecified savings further in this paper. As noted below at footnote 61 the IPHA accounts for 
the vast majority of the purchases by the State of medicines supplied by the international research based 
pharmaceutical industry in Ireland.  
5
 See Table 1 below for details. It was also cited in Mitchell (2016b). 
6
 Indeed, access was specifically denied. See Mitchell (2016b). 
7
 Brick et al (2013a) and Gorecki et al (2012). 
8
 The 2010 to 2015 agreement was extended for a year until the Agreement was signed.  
9
 It is difficult to get a precise estimate but appears to be around 85%. For details see Gorecki et al (2012, pp. 
16-17). 
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year from 1991 to 2009, when expenditure peaked at slightly below €2 billion.10 
Subsequently, such expenditure has declined somewhat and stabilised.11  In 2014 
community drug schemes accounted for 14.5% of the State health budget.12  However, the 
evidence suggests that increased demand for medicines, especially in view of the high 
priced new medicines coming to market, is likely to bring renewed pressure on the State’s 
community drug schemes.13 
 
In the analysis below we pay particular attention to the General Medical Scheme (GMS) and 
the High Tech Drug (HTD) scheme. GMS is a means tested benefit that provides medicines 
free of charge subject to a €2.50 copayment per item dispensed which is capped at €25 per 
family per month.14 HTD medicines are generally prescribed or initiated in hospital and are 
often high priced.  Access to HTD medicines is provided to GMS and Drug Payment Scheme 
(DPS) patients.  DPS is a non-means tested benefit, with the patient (or family) paying the 
first €144 per month, the State the excess. 
 
The HTD and GMS are the two largest community drug schemes, with, in 2015, total 
ingredient costs of €473 million and €695 million, respectively.15  While in 2015 there were 
for the GMS 2,166,159 eligible persons, there were only 70,321 HTD recipients. The average 
prescription cost in 2015 for GMS was €12, for HTD, €750.  However, while the nominal total 
ingredient cost of the GMS has declined between 2009 and 2015 by 27%, despite the 
number of eligible persons for GMS increasing by 47%, the total ingredient cost of the HTD 
increased by 69%.   
 
Controlling Medicine Costs 
                                                     
10
 Barry (2015, Slide 3). Community drug schemes include the General Medical Scheme, the Drugs Payment 
Scheme, the Long Term Illness Scheme and the High Tech Drug Scheme. For further details of the schemes see 
HSE (2016a, pp. 6-7). 
11
 Barry (2015, Slide 3), which presents expenditure for 2009 to 2014.  In the latter year expenditure was 
around €1.8 billion. 
12
 Joint Committee on Health and Children (2015, p. 14), the numerator is defined as “reimbursements on 
medicines and appliances.”  
13
 Barry (2015). 
14
 These charges were introduced on 1 December 2013. As of 1 March 2017, for those persons 70 years of age 
and over, the per item charge was reduced to €2.00 and the monthly maximum to €20 per family per month. 
For details see: http://www.hse.ie/eng/services/list/1/schemes/mc/prescriptioncharge/. Accessed 23 May 
2017. 
15
 All figures in this paragraph are taken from HSE (2010, 2016a) various tables and text.  
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The pattern of medicines expenditure in Ireland since 2009 reflects, in part, a series of 
administrative and legislative public policy measures at various levels in the supply chain: 
ex-factory or manufacturer; wholesale; and, retail or pharmacy.  These measures were a 
response to consistent criticism of high medicine prices, low penetration of generics and 
large mark-ups in the supply chain combined with the onset of tight budgetary controls 
occasioned by the financial crisis of 2008.  
 
Reducing wholesale and retail mark-ups 
 
Research commissioned by the HSE demonstrating high wholesale and retail mark-ups for 
medicines led to the HSE imposing dramatically reduced mark-ups at both levels in the 
supply chain between 2008 and 2011.16  
 
Increasing generic penetration: the Health Act 2013 
In response to persistent reports of the low penetration of generics in both the community 
and the hospital setting in Ireland, compared to other developed countries,17 the Health 
(Pricing and Supply of Medical Goods) Act 2013 (the Health Act 2013) was introduced.  For 
the first time a legal basis was provided for generic substitution by the pharmacist.  The 
medical practitioner could, of course, always have prescribed a generic medicine.  
 
The Health Products Regulatory Authority (HPRA) was given responsibility under the Health 
Act 2013 for establishing, publishing and maintaining a List of Interchangeable Medicines 
(the Interchangeable List).18  The DoH directed the HPRA to “assess the interchangeability of 
a number of active substances in 2014.”19 The first medicine to be included on the 
Interchangeable List was atrovastatin on 7 August 2013. At the present time there are 76 
                                                     
16
 For details see Gorecki et al (2012, Table 2.3, p.23; pp. 86-88; pp. 112-113).  The wholesale mark-up was 
reduced from 17.66% to 8%; the retail mark-up from 50 to 20%.  There was considerable resistance to such 
moves by wholesalers and pharmacies.  The reduction applied to community drug schemes operated by the 
State.  Note that some community drug schemes, such as the GMS, had no retail mark-up. 
17
 For details see Brick et al (2013a, pp. 89-92) and Gorecki et al (2012, pp. 126-130). 
18
 Full details may be found on the HPRA’s website: https://www.hpra.ie/homepage/medicines/regulatory-
information/generic-and-interchangeable-medicines/. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
19
 http://www.hpra.ie/homepage/medicines/regulatory-information/generic-and-interchangeable-
medicines/consultations-and-updates-to-the-list. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
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‘active substances’ on the Interchangeable List,20 including, in some cases, combinations of 
separately listed substances.21 
 
The HSE was given legislative authority for setting the reference price for a group of 
interchangeable medicinal products, once the HPRA had included the products on the 
Interchangeable List.22 Certain legislative criteria were set down in section 24(3) of the 
Health Act 2013 as to how the reference price is to be determined which reflects concerns 
over cost and the need to ensure cost effectiveness.23  Furthermore the HSE “may use a 
competitive process to set the reference price for a relevant group of interchangeable 
medicinal product.”24  
 
In practice in setting the reference price the HSE pays considerable attention to the price 
charged in other EU Member States.  In the case of atorvastatin the HSE stated prices were 
high in Ireland, even in relation to other small Member States, and that this difference 
“supports substantial price reductions.”25 
The evidence suggests that the State has been successful in reducing expenditure on 
medicines deemed interchangeable by the HPRA and for which the HSE has set a reference 
price.  In the case of atorvastatin monthly expenditure fell by approximately 50% between 
                                                     
20
 The Interchangeable List may be found at: http://www.hpra.ie/homepage/medicines/regulatory-
information/generic-and-interchangeable-medicines/list-of-interchangeable-medicines. Accessed 23 May 
2017.    
21
 For example, amiodipine and perindopril are listed as active substances both separately and as perindopril/ 
amiodipine.  See previous footnote for source. Note that medicines consisting of three or more active 
substances are not included on the Interchangeable List. 
22
 Section 24, Health Act 2013. The reference price is that which the HSE reimburses the pharmacist under the 
various community drug schemes. 
23
 These include: “the value for money,” “the relevant prices of therapeutically similar medicines,” “the 
resources available to the” HSE, “the equivalent relevant prices (if practicably available) of the relevant listed 
items in all other Member States where one or more than one of the relevant listed items is marketed,” and the 
terms of any agreement in place between the HSE and industry and other representative bodies.  
24
 Section 24(4), Health Act 2013.  Such competitive processes might include competitive tendering, although 
we are not aware of any examples of its application for community drug schemes. 
25
 HSE (2013, p. 2). Since this was the first instance in which the HSE set a reference price under the Health Act 
2013, the HSE released several explanatory background documents, which may be accessed at:  
http://www.hse.ie/eng/health/hl/Generics/ref/development.html. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
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August 2013 and August 2014;26 for esomeprazole over the same period the reduction was 
40%.27  
The European Commission (2016, p. 74) commented that interchangeability combined with 
reference pricing “has generated savings on off-patent medicines. It has also increased the 
penetration of generics (international non-proprietary name plus branded generics), which 
represented 38.7 % of the volume of total medicines covered under the public system and 11 
% in value in Q3-2015.” However, the European Commission was concerned about the lack 
of progress of the use by prescribers of the international non-proprietary name. 
Reducing ex-factory prices 
Efforts to moderate the ex-factory price of medicines, especially new medicines, reflect 
longstanding and widespread concerns that medicines prices and per capita expenditure on 
medicines were high in Ireland compared to other developed countries.28  Under successive 
agreements between the State and the IPHA the State has sought to exert downward 
pressure on medicine prices. Measures include the addition of some lower priced 
Nominated States in the basket used to determine the price of new medicines and 
additional discounts on medicines where patent protection has expired.29 
 
These and other measures, however, failed to assuage concerns about medicine prices and 
per capita expenditure on medicines as reflected in: the experience of Irish residents 
purchasing medicines in countries such as Spain while on vacation;30 press reports;31 reports 
of the legislature;32 research, some of which has been sponsored by the DoH and the HSE;33 
                                                     
26
 Based on State expenditure under the GMS and the DPS which in August 2013 was €8.6 million, in August 
2014, €4.2 million. The reference price for esomeprazole became effective on 1 November 2013. For details 
see Barry (2015, Slide 13). 
27
 Based on State expenditure under the GMS and the DPS which in August 2013 was €7.4 million, in August 
2014, €4.5 million. The reference price became effective on 1 January 2014. For details see Barry (2015, Slide 
12). 
28
 This applied especially for new medicines and those with no generic competition (i.e. off-patent medicines 
with exclusive supply). 
29
 These are discussed in Brick et al (2013a) and Gorecki et al (2012). 
30
 Based on conversations with individuals visiting these countries. 
31
 See, for example, Mitchell (2016a). 
32
 See, for example, Joint Committee on Health & Children, Houses of the Oireachtas (2015). 
33
 See, for example, Brick et al (2013a) and Gorecki et al (2012), which were funded in this way, and IFAC 
(2015). 
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and, the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which were 
responsible for providing financial assistance to Ireland after the financial crisis in 2008.34 
 
Preparations for negotiations with IPHA 
In preparation for the negotiations with IPHA that led to the Agreement the negotiators on 
behalf of the State, were assisted by recommendations and suggestions as to how the ex-
factory prices of new and existing medicines might be reduced and better value for money 
secured.  These recommendations and suggestions were made relative to the 2012-2015 
agreement (which was extended for an additional year to 2016) between the State and IPHA 
and included:35 
 The use of the lowest, rather than the average, of the basket of nine Nominated 
States, all in the EU,36 used to set the external reference price of a new 
pharmaceutical.37 A number of other countries, also relying on reference pricing, use 
the lowest as opposed to the average;38 
 The external reference price should be updated semi-annually (1 January and 1 July) 
rather than every two years. Ireland is often an earlier adopter of a new medicine 
with an initially high price. Hence it is important that the external reference price is 
updated to reflect its availability at lower prices in other countries in the basket of 
Nominated States.39 
 Parallel imports should be monitored by the HSE to validate the pricing information 
provided by the medicine manufacturers in setting the external reference price and 
in order to determine whether additional countries should be added to the basket of 
nine countries.40 
                                                     
34
 See, for example, IMF (2013, p.90) which, together with the EU, demanded that a report be prepared on 
these issues, which resulted in Brick et al (2013a). 
35
 These recommendations and suggestions are taken from Brick et al (2013a) and Gorecki et al (2012).  In 
some instances these are reflected in the Joint Committee on Health & Children (2015) report on the cost of 
prescription drugs in Ireland, particularly the first three, but not the fourth.   
36
 The nine Nominated States are: Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; the Netherlands; 
Spain; and, the UK. 
37
 Gorecki et al (2012, p.43). 
38
 Gorecki et al (2012, Table 4.1, p. 40). 
39
 Gorecki et al (2012, p.44). 
40
 Gorecki et al (2012, p. 50). 
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 Consideration to a public dialogue on whether or not the appropriate cost-
effectiveness threshold value of a QALY is €45,000 – as set out in the 2012-2015 
agreement41 - given that the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) used a threshold range from €23,000/QALY to €35,000/QALY while NICE 
commissioned research suggested a lower threshold of €21,500/QALY.42 
Armed not only with a research base with which to inform itself in the negotiations with 
IPHA, the Health Act 2013 gave the HSE some additional powers that increased, in legislative 
terms at least, its bargaining power vis a vis the suppliers of new medicines in achieving 
price reductions. The Health Act 2013, for example, provided the HSE, once the 2012-2015 
agreement had expired, the legal basis to set the price of new medicines unilaterally.43  
EVALUATING THE AGREEMENT 
Introduction 
There have been agreements between the State and the representative organization of the 
manufacturers of patented protected medicines setting the ex-factor price of medicines 
since July 1969.44  In this section we outline the key features of the Agreement, how they 
compare to the 2012-2015 agreement (and, in some cases, earlier agreements) and the 
extent, where relevant, that the recommendations and suggestions informing the 
negotiations were reflected in the Agreement.  
The €600 million savings claimed by the Minister for Health for the Agreement is aligned 
with key clauses of the Agreement (Table 1).45  The most important category of savings is 
due, for example, to Clause 9, ‘Rebate on Sales,’ accounting slightly over a third of total 
savings. Hence in the discussion of the key features of the Agreement we will comment, 
                                                     
41
 Annex 1, point 5, 2012-2015 agreement.  
42
 Brick et al (2013a, 25-29).  See also Dillion (2015). 
43
 Sections 18 and 21, Health Act 2013. 
44
 In undertaking Brick et al (2013a) and Gorecki et al (2012), the DoH and HSE provided previous agreements.  
The July 1969 agreement, between the Pharmaceutical and Allied Industries Association and the DoH, was the 
earliest.  It was five pages in length. 
45
 The IPHA (2016) claimed that the savings due to the Agreement were €785 million. However, we do not 
have access IPHA estimates analogous to those in Table 1 and hence confine attention in this paper only to the 
DoH’s estimates.  Nevertheless, the IPHA estimates use no agreement as the counterfactual, while the 
estimates refer to only IPHA members.  For a discussion of the IPHA estimates see Mitchell (2016b). 
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where relevant, on its implications for the State’s medicines bill.  In other words, how 
credible are the estimates of savings due to the Agreement? 
Table 1: Government Estimates of the Agreement’s Savings, Public Purchases, 2016-2020 
Source of Savings  
(Clause of Agreement or 2012-2015 agreement)  
Cumulative Savings 
2016-2020 
(€m) 
Original Ex-Factory Price of New Medicine (Clause 6 & Assessment 
Principles)a 
None 
Annual Ex-Factory Price Alignments on Patent Protected and 
Exclusive Off-Patented Medicines (Clauses 5, 7.1.3 & 8.1.4)b 
 205 
Pricing of Patent-Expired, Non-Exclusive (Excluding Biologic) 
Medicines (Clause 7) 
 
      Existing Clause 6 (of 2012-2015 agreement) 90 
      Price Reduction Straight to 50%c 25 
Pricing of Patent-Expired, Non-Exclusive Biologic Medicines (Clause 
8)  
      Biologics less 30% 
55 
Rebate on Sales (Clause 9)  
     Existing Rebate (4%) Clause 9 (of the 2012-2015 agreement)d 115 
     Hospital Rebate (5.25% rising to 5.5%)e 70 
     Extra Rebate (1.25% rising to 1.5%)e 40 
Total 600 
a. Original Ex-Factory Price of a New Medicine was not included in the DoH documentation, but 
DoH confirmed that there were no savings under this heading in the €600 million. 
b. “Extended Reference Basket & Price Realignments” in the DoH documentation. 
c. “Clause 7 (previous Clause 6) straight to 50%” in the DoH documentation.  Instead of 30% in 
year 1 and 50% in year 2, the 50% reduction occurs in year 1. 
d. “PCRS Rebate” in DoH documentation. DoH confirmed that this referred to the 4% rebate in 
the 2012-2015 agreement and continued in the Agreement. 
e. The first increase occurred from 1 June 2016 to 31 July 2018; the second from 1 August 2018 
to 31 July 2018. 
Source: Based on information provided by the DoH. 
It should be noted that there is no detailed account of the methodology, modelling, data 
sources or assumptions in the public domain concerning the DoH’s derivation of the €600 
million.  All that is available is the table itself and the press release issued by the DoH 
(2016a) on the announcement of the Agreement.46,47  
                                                     
46
 The figures in the table were, for example, used by Mitchell (2016b). 
47
 In a number of instances it was not entirely what the link was between the information provided on which 
Table 1 is based and the Agreement.  DoH helpfully provided clarification. 
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The Counterfactual 
In evaluating the impact of any policy intervention an important issue is relative to what?  In 
other words, if the policy intervention had not taken place what would the world have 
looked like? This is sometimes referred to as the counterfactual.  It provides a benchmark 
against which to measure the impact of the policy intervention.   
In the case of assessing the impact on competition of a merger between two firms, the 
counterfactual is typically taken as the world in which these two firms continue to act as 
independent entities competing with one another; in other words, the status quo.48  The 
state of competition between the two states – the status quo and the merger - is then 
compared to determine the impact of the merger on competition. 
In a recent UK evaluation of the value of certain services (e.g. managing drug shortages, 
managing prescribing errors) provided by pharmacies, pwc (2016) assumed that under the 
counterfactual that although pharmacies would not provide these services, patients might 
be able to access the services via other existing channels.  In other words, the 
counterfactual was not that the services would fail to be supplied at all, but that only one 
source or channel would cease to supply. 
In the case of the cost-effectiveness analysis undertaken by the National Centre for 
Pharmacoeconomcis (NCPE) for the HSE – which we discuss in more detail below – for a new 
medicine, the counterfactual is existing therapies, which may include other medicines. In 
other words, the counterfactual is how patients would be treated absent the new medicine.  
The alternative is not no treatment. The NCPE, on the basis of a comparison with the 
counterfactual, determines whether or not the new medicine is value for money/cost 
effective. 
In the case of the Agreement the counterfactual is what would have happened absent the 
Agreement. The counterfactual in terms of HSE medicine expenditure can then be 
compared to the Agreement in terms of HSE medicine expenditure.  The difference in 
expenditure can then be attributed to the Agreement. 
                                                     
48
 Competition and Consumer Protection Commission (2014, paras. 1.12-1.15). 
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It seems reasonable to assume that the State and the IPHA would have concluded an 
agreement covering the period 2016-2020.  Such agreements have existed since 1969 and 
have been renewed and renegotiated on a regular basis. Hence while it may have made 
sense in 1969 to argue that the counterfactual was a world without a State/IPHA 
agreement, in 2016 it was more difficult, but it is an issue we will return to below and in 
‘Implications.’ 
The next question is naturally what agreement.  The simplest assumption or counterfactual 
– and the one we make in the analysis below – is to assume that the 2012-2015 agreement 
would have been replicated and its three year term extended by one year to 2020. In other 
words, the savings envisaged under the Agreement are derived by a comparison with the 
2012-2015 agreement, the status quo.  
The baseline projection for HSE medicine expenditure is the existing 2012-2015 agreement.  
If the State can negotiate better terms then there will be additional funds available to spend 
on medicines.  The DoH press release announcing the Agreement is consistent with the view 
that the counterfactual is the 2012-2015 agreement, rather than no agreement.  
The DoH (2016a) states, for example,  
“The pricing provisions in this agreement represent a significant improvement 
on those contained in the previous agreement. They will see an expansion of 
the reference basket used to set prices in Ireland from the present nine to 14 
countries, including for the first time Greece, Italy and Portugal. The 
agreement also includes, for the first time, an annual price realignment to 
ensure that the prices of medicines in Ireland reduce in line with price changes 
across the reference Countries. A rebate of 5.25% rising to 5.5% will further 
reduce the overall cost of medicines in the years ahead.” 
In the ‘Notes to Editors’, the press release points out the key pricing elements in the 
Agreement, which highlight the improvements as compared with the 2012-2015 agreement. 
Nevertheless, inspection of Table 1 and discussions with the DoH, confirm that the 
counterfactual underlying the €600 million estimate is no agreement.  This is a hard position 
to justify given, as noted above, the long record of State/IPHA agreements stretching back 
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almost 50 years.  Furthermore if for whatever reason a State/IPHA agreement could not be 
reached the counterfactual is not no agreement: the HSE has power under the Health Act 
2013 to set the terms and conditions on which it will purchase medicines unilaterally.49 
Indeed, during the course of the negotiations leading to the Agreement, the State 
threatened to unilaterally use its powers under the Health Act 2013 to set medicine prices.50 
It is, however, an empirical question whether the choice of the no agreement 
counterfactual or the 2012-2105 agreement or status quo counterfactual makes a material 
difference in the estimate of the savings flowing from the Agreement. 
Signatories to the Agreement 
Agreement provisions 
There are three signatories to the Agreement: on behalf of the sellers of medicines, IPHA; 
on behalf of buyers, the HSE and the State Negotiation Team.51 The State Negotiation Team 
also includes representatives from the DoH, DPER and the OGP.52 DPER was only created in 
2011 and is responsible for monitoring public expenditure and, not surprisingly has issued a 
number of reports on the health service, including the community drug schemes.53 As part 
and parcel of setting up DPER, the Irish Government Economic and Evaluation Service 
(IGEES) was the created, in part because of the perceived lack of economic expertise in 
central government departments at the time of the financial crisis of 2008.   
A comparison with the 2012-2015 agreement 
The 2012-2015 agreement was between the IPHA, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
HSE and the DoH.  Such a pattern is consistent with earlier agreements.54 Hence the major 
                                                     
49
 See Box 1 below.  Furthermore reference pricing is independent of the Agreement. 
50
 For further discussion see Harris (2016) and Wall & Bardon (2016). 
51
 Agreement, p. 13. 
52
 Agreement, ‘Introduction’, p. 1.  See also DPER (2016, p. 26). 
53
 For details see: http://igees.gov.ie/publications/economic-analysis/health/. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
Callaghan (2015), for example, discusses the Primary Care Reimbursement Service (PCRS) of the HSE which 
administers the community drug schemes. 
54
 Prior to the HSE coming into operation on 1 January 2005 the DoH signed the agreement in behalf of the 
buyers. The HSE was the sole signatory on behalf of the buyers for the 2006-2010 agreement. 
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change between the Agreement and earlier agreements is the addition of DPER to the 
negotiating team on behalf of the buyers.   
Discussion 
It is difficult to evaluate the involvement of DPER on the final Agreement.  It is not possible 
to design a counterfactual without the involvement of DPER.  Notwithstanding this, there 
are two areas where one might reasonably have expected the influence of a central 
government department concerned with public expenditure and value for money staffed by 
economists to have manifested itself. 
The first is on the setting a cost-effectiveness threshold and strict criteria if this threshold is 
to be exceeded.55,56  However, as we shall see below, if anything, the cost-effectiveness 
thresholds appear to have been relaxed if not abolished, in the Agreement compared to the 
2012-2015 agreement. 
The second is publication of an analysis of the savings to be expected from the Agreement, 
together with the underlying methodology and assumptions.  This could easily have been 
included in DPER’s series of papers on health issues.  However, no such analysis has been 
published to date.  
Scope & Term 
Agreement provisions 
The Agreement refers “solely” to medicines of IPHA member firms included on the 
Reimbursement List and/or supplied to, or reimbursed by the HSE (under, for example, the 
community drug schemes) and/or State-funded hospitals.57 Under section 17 of the Health 
                                                     
55
  This is pertinent when considering the original price of a new medicine. 
56
 For example, a central government department would arguably have a strong interest in securing a 
consistent approach across government departments and agencies to issues such as the value of a QALY 
and/or the value of a life. 
57
 Clause 2.1 of the Agreement.  Relevant Agencies are covered by the Agreement. These are defined to 
include not only State-funded hospitals but also “any other publicly-funded entities and State agencies in each 
case whose functions include the provision of” medicines.  Terms are defined in Clause 1.2 of the Agreement. 
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Act 2013 the HSE has to maintain a Reimbursement List of medicines which are eligible for 
patients on the community drug schemes and in State funded hospitals.58 
Although the Agreement is between the State and the IPHA,59 it appears its provisions 
applies all suppliers of new medicines filing applications for inclusion on the Reimbursement 
List, irrespective of whether or not they are members of IPHA.60   The Agreement’s pricing 
arrangements refers to all medicines, including biologic and biosimilars.   
Notwithstanding the wide applicability of the Agreement, the savings estimates presented 
in Table 1 only refer to IPHA members. However, since the IPHA accounts for the vast 
majority of the research based pharmaceutical industry, the omission of a small number of 
companies should not result in a serious underestimate of the impact of the Agreement.61 
The Agreement commenced on 1 August 2016 and expires on 31 July 2020, with the 
expectation that negotiations for a successor agreement will commence six months before 
the expiry of the Agreement.62  
A comparison with the 2012-2015 agreement 
There is a considerable degree of similarity in terms of the scope and term.  The four year 
term of the Agreement is, for example, not significantly out of line with the duration of 
earlier such agreements.  The first agreement between the State and the industry 
representative body ran for four years, more recently the length has been between three to 
four years.63 
                                                     
58
 Interchangeable medicines would be included on the Reimbursement List at the reference price. The 
Reimbursement List also includes medical and surgical appliances.  In some parts of the Health Act 2013 these 
are referred to as ‘items’. 
59
 Clause 2.2 of the Agreement. 
60
 McCullagh and Barry (2016).  The DoH (2016a) refers to additional unspecified savings for non-IPHA 
suppliers which would include Vertex Pharmaceuticals and Gilead Sciences Inc. 
61
 According to the IPHA its members account for in excess of 90% of the purchases by the State of medicines 
supplied by the international research based pharmaceutical industry in Ireland.  
62
 Clause 3 of the Agreement. 
63
 See Brick et al (2013a, Table 3.1, p. 19).  Three to four years refers to the length as set out in the 2006-2010 
and 2012-2015 agreements.  However, in both cases these agreements were extended and in one case an 
interim arrangement was put in place.  If these extensions and interim arrangements are taken into account 
then the 2006-2010 agreement ran to 2012 and the 2012-2015 agreement ran to 2016.  It may be, of course, 
be the case that the Agreement is extended beyond 2020. 
16 | P a g e  
 
In contrast to the 2012-2015 agreement, however, there is no provision for a Mid Term 
Review.64  There is, however, a provision in the Agreement under “Oversight of Agreement” 
for “[T]he Parties to meet bi-annually on dates to be agreed between the Parties to review 
and discuss any issues arising from the operation of the Agreement.”65  A similar provision 
appeared in the 2006-201066 agreement. Given the limited scope of the Mid Term Review, 
there appears to be a considerable degree of continuity in the review provisions across 
recent agreements between the State and the IPHA.  
Original Ex-Factory Price of New Medicines 
The agreement provisions67 
The Agreement contains provisions for the original or initial pricing of new medicines for 
inclusion in the Reimbursement List. Once the original price of a new medicine is set it is 
realigned on an annual basis as set out in Clause 5 of the Agreement and discussed in the 
next section.  A new medicine is defined as one “with a Marketing Authorisation introduced 
into the State after the commencement of this Agreement, during the Term ...”68 
All applications by a supplier for a new medicine to be added to the Reimbursement List, 
“shall be made in accordance with the relevant provisions of the [Health Act] 
2013 ... and with the provisions set out in Schedule 1, the Principles and 
Processes for the Assessment of new Medicines in Ireland (hereinafter ‘the 
Assessment Principles’) which form an integral part of this Agreement.”  
The Agreement then lists two mechanisms for the determination of the maximum supplier 
original price, depending on whether or not the medicine is available in at least one of the 
fourteen Nominated States set out in the Agreement on the date of application:69  
                                                     
64
 Clause 12.1, 2012-2015 agreement. The Mid Term Review only referred to the “governance and operation” 
of the 2012-2015 agreement. 
65
 Clause 13.6 of the Agreement. 
66
 Clause 11.1, 2006-2010 agreement, which read: “The operation of this Agreement will be reviewed by the 
HSE and IPHA at regular intervals and any matter relating to the interpretation of these terms, including price 
terms or the operation of the Agreement, shall be resolved in discussions between the IPHA and HSE.”  
67
 Clause 6 of the Agreement and the Assessment Principles. 
68
 Clause 1 of the Agreement. 
69
 The fourteen Nominated States are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.  (Clause 1.2 of the Agreement).  Together 
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- if the new medicine is available in one or more of the Nominated States then the 
medicine’s maximum proposed original price is the average price across the 
Nominated States in which the medicine is available; or 
- if the new medicine is not available in any of the Nominated States, then the 
suppliers “shall propose a price which shall be considered by the HSE in accordance 
with the [Health Act] 2013 … and, as applicable, the HSE Assessment Principles.” 
Hence the supplier of a new medicine proposes a maximum original price based either on 
the mean across some or all of the Nominated States or on the provisions of the Health Act 
2013 and the Assessment Principles. 
Assessment Principles70 
The Assessment Principles, Schedule 1 of the Agreement, set out the “central principles and 
guidelines that will underpin the assessment of new medicines in Ireland which seek to be 
added to the Reimbursement List …”71  The Assessment Principles are based on and reflect 
the provisions of the Health Act 2013.  The principles are the responsibility of the HSE.  After 
permitting IPHA to make representations, the HSE “reserves the right to amend or update 
the content hereof as it deems appropriate with the [Health Act] 2013 ... and, as applicable, 
the HSE Assessment Principles.”72   
The key features of the Assessment Principles with respect to the approval and pricing of a 
new medicine is as follows. 
First, in assessing whether or not to include a new medicine on the Reimbursement List and 
at what price, the HSE shall have regard to the criteria specified in the Health Act 2013.73  
These criteria, which are reproduced in Box 1, provide the legal basis for considerations of 
cost-effectiveness, notably, explicitly framing the issue in terms of the opportunity cost of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
with Ireland, these fifteen Member States constituted the EU15 prior to the accession of 10 candidate 
countries on 1 May 2004. 
70
 Schedule 1 of the Agreement. 
71
 Agreement, p. 16. 
72
 Agreement, p. 17. 
73
 Agreement, pp. 18-19. 
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other interventions foregone.74  The other factor that is stressed in the Health Act 2013 is 
the resource implications of listing/pricing a new medicine in terms of the HSE budget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, in reaching a decision on the application of these criteria, the HSE draws on the 
expertise and advice of the NCPE.75 The latter plays a vital role in reviewing all applications 
                                                     
74
 Implicitly this criterion recognizes the concept of opportunity cost, since the alternative to expenditure on a 
medicine non-medicine related healthcare expenditures. See O’Mahony & Coughlan (2016) for further 
discussion. 
75
 According to its website, http://www.ncpe.ie/, “[T]he mission of the NCPE is to facilitate healthcare decisions 
on the reimbursement of technologies, by applying clinical and scientific evidence in a systematic framework, in 
order to maximise population wellness.” For a full account of the role played by the NCPE see McCullagh and 
Barry (2016). 
BOX 1: Panel A, Criteria to Add a Medicine to the Reimbursement List, Health Act 2013 
Section 19(4) states that the HSE “shall not make a relevant decision” to add a new medicine to the 
Reimbursement List except in accordance with the criteria specified in Schedule 3.  Part 3 of that schedule 
states that the HSE “shall have regard to”: 
(a) the health needs of the public, 
(b) The cost-effectiveness of meeting health needs by supplying the item concerned rather 
than providing other health services, 
(c) ...., 
(d) the proposed costs, benefits and risks of the item ... relative to therapeutically similar 
items ... provided in other health service settings and the level of certainty in relation to 
the evidence of those costs, benefits and risks, 
(e) the potential or actual budget impact of the item ..., 
(f) the clinical need for the item ..., 
(g) ... , 
(h) The efficacy (performance in trial), effectiveness (performance in real situations) and 
added therapeutic benefit against existing standards of treatment (how much better it 
treats a condition than existing therapies), and, 
(i) the resources available to the HSE. 
BOX 1: Panel B, Criteria to Set the Price of a New Medicine Added to the Reimbursement List, Health Act 
2013 
Section 21 (2) states that the HSE “when considering the proposed relevant price by the supplier of an item 
take into account”: 
(a) the equivalent relevant prices (if practicably available) of the item on all other Member 
States where the item is marketed, 
(b) the relevant prices of therapeutically similar listed items, 
(c) the potential therapeutic benefits of the item for patients likely to use the item if it were to 
become a listed item, 
(d) the potential budget impact if it were to become a listed item, 
(e) ...., 
(f) the resources available to the Executive, and 
(g) the terms of any agreement in place .... between the Executive and any representative 
body of the suppliers of drugs, medicines ... where the agreement relates ... to the price of 
the item. 
Note: Executive refers to the HSE; item to drug, medicine, or medical or surgical appliance which is not on 
the Reimbursement List. 
Source: Health Act 2013 
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by suppliers of new medicines76 and pays particular attention to Part 3, Schedule 3 of the 
Health Act 2013, which is reproduced in Box 1.77   
 
Third, the Assessment Principles set out a decision-making authority cost-effectiveness 
threshold/net budget impact matrix which is reproduced as Table 2: the greater the budget 
impact and/or the higher the cost per QALY, the more likely that the senior most level of 
HSE management becomes the decision maker.   
Fourth, Table 2 is the only mention of the application of cost-effectiveness threshold in the 
HSE decision making process in the Agreement.  The table implies that there is no threshold 
in terms of either the cost per QALY and/or the budget impact of a new medicine, subject, 
of course, to any HSE budget constraint and the criteria in the Health Act 2013. 
Fifth, there is a strict timetable laid down for the processing of an application for a new 
medicine to be included on the Reimbursement List.  These are consistent with section 18 of 
the Health Act 2013. 
Table 2: Decision Making Authority for New Medicines, by Budget Impact & QALY, Ireland, 2016-
2020a 
 QALY Threshold as per NCPE Assessment 
 
Net Budget 
Impact as 
per NCPE 
Assessment 
for each  
medicine 
 Up to €20,000  Up to €45,000 Above €45,000 
Budget 
Neutral-
€5m 
HSE (non-leadership) HSE (non-leadership) HSE Leadership 
>€5m 
<€20m 
HSE (non-leadership) HSE Leadership HSE Leadership 
>€20m HSE Leadership HSE Leadership HSE Leadership 
Note: The HSE reserves the right for all medicines to be considered by the Leadership. The NCPE’s 
estimate of the budget impact is over five years but is subject to a gross budget impact of less than 
€30m for the two lower thresholds in the table. 
Source: Agreement, p. 24. 
                                                     
76
 Agreement, p. 20.   
77
 This is reproduced in Box 1. The use of Part 3 of Schedule 3 of the Health Act 2013 is explicitly acknowledged 
in the diagram at p. 23 of the Agreement. 
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Sixth, where a medicine cannot be funded by the HSE from existing resources, the HSE may 
inform the DoH “of its decision in this respect. The Department of Health may, as it deems 
appropriate, bring a memorandum to Government in relation to the funding implications 
and requesting consideration of same.”78 So far as we are aware this does not appear to 
have happened to date.79 
Implementation: the NCPE/HSE Review Process80 
The supplier submits to the HSE its proposed price and any associated documentation for a 
new medicine for inclusion on the Reimbursement List.  The HSE initially refers the material 
to the NCPE for a Rapid Review (within four weeks) with respect to the budget impact and 
cost-effectiveness – the two dimensions of the decision matrix in Table 2.81  The NCPE’s 
Rapid Review recommends whether or not the new medicine should be subject to a Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA).82,83 New medicines that lie in the south west quadrant of 
Table 2 – high cost per QALY and/or high net budget impact – are typically subject to a 
HTA.84 In some cases the supplier will decide not to proceed to a HTA where this has been 
recommended by the NCPE, in others the supplier will propose price reductions to avoid an 
HTA.85  
The NCPE, based on the HTA, recommends to the HSE whether or not the new medicine 
should be added to the Reimbursement List at the submitted price.86 It is the HSE’s decision 
as to whether or not to add a medicine to the Reimbursement List and if so at what price 
                                                     
78
 Agreement, para. 12, p. 21.  See also the NCPE’s Process Flowchart, http://www.ncpe.ie/submission-
process/process-flochart/.  Accessed 23 May 2017.   
79
 With one possible exception.  See footnote 93 below. 
80
 For details see diagram on p. 23 of the Agreement. McCullagh & Barry (2016) provide a through description 
of the process based upon their experience in the NCPE. 
81
 Over the period 2010 to 2015, 230 Rapid Reviews were conducted, with an HTA recommended in 122 or 
53% instances. For further details of the outcomes see McCullagh and Barry (2016, p. 8).  
82
 For references to the HTA methodology see: http://www.ncpe.ie/submission-process/hta-guidelines/.  
Accessed 23 May 2017. 
83
  McCullagh & Barry (2016, p. 4) discusses the factors that determine whether the NCPE recommends the 
medicine should be added to the Reimbursement List at the Rapid Review stage.  For example, the medicine 
covers only “a small eligible population ..., an unmet need and an associated low budget impact (p. 4).”  
84
 This is stated by the NCPE: http://www.ncpe.ie/pharmacoeconomic-evaluations/.  Accessed 23 May 2017. 
85
 McCullagh & Barry (2016, p. 8). 
86
 A short summary of the HTA is published on the NCPE’s website. However, there are no summaries available 
of the Rapid Reviews.   
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and any possible conditions. However, the HSE does not issue any reasoned decision 
concerning acceptance/refusal of a new medicine for reimbursement purposes.87 
In terms of cost effectiveness the NCPE uses a QALY threshold of €45,000.88 Table 3 presents 
ten instances between August 2016 and January 2017 where the verdict “Reimbursement is 
not recommended at the submitted price” was the outcome of the NCPE’s HTA.89 In several 
instances the cost per QALY at the submitted price is exceeds the €45,000 threshold by a 
factor in excess of 10 or 20 fold.  The budget implications in some cases exceed €100 
million.  HSE reimbursement decisions on these medicines will be made in the coming 
months.90 
Table 3: National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics, Reimbursement Not Recommended at 
Submitted Price,a Ten Examples, August 2016 -January 2017.b 
INNc Brand   QALYd 
 
Five year Budget Impact 
Gross/Nete 
(million) 
obinutuzumab  Gazyvaro €52,248 €6.5/€5.6 
colimetinib  Cotellic €108,284 - €326,868f €22.1/€15-16.5 
human alpha-1 proteinase 
inhibitor 
Respreeza €581,322 
 
€37.1/€n.a. 
elosulfase alfa  Vimizim €1,032,228 €11/€11 
vortioxetine  Brintellix €3,210,230 €13.4/€10.2 
carfilzomib Kyprolis €73,449 & €125,759f €26.4/€9.7 
evolocumab Repatha €286,182-€452,741 & 
€204,700-€299,336f 
€152.3 to €258/€n.a 
ivacaftorg Kalydeco €465,546 €21.0/€15.3-€22.7 
nivolumabh Opdivo €202,393 €57.1/€56.3 
ruxolitinib Jakavi €320,600 €11.7/€10.5 
a. Typically the medicine is approved for particular treatment. It is possible that the medicine 
has already been approved for certain treatment and the supplier is applying for further 
treatment uses.  See, for example, footnotes g and h below. 
b. 16 August 2016 to 26 January 2017. Dated by when the NCPE completes its evaluation, as 
per the NCPE’s website.  
                                                     
87
 Under point 15 of the Assessment Principles the “HSE will publish a Drugs Group meeting note in relation to 
its deliberations on each medicine considered by the Drugs Group.  This will be published at the final conclusion 
of the reimbursement application process and following notification to the Company of the final decision.”  
However, after an examination of the HSE’s website, we were unable to locate these minutes. 
88
 For details see: http://www.ncpe.ie/submission-process/. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
89
 Note that a medicine in Table 3 may have already been approved by the HSE for reimbursement for 
particular indications.  However, the supplier has decided to file an application for an extension of the 
medicine’s uses.  
90
 In the case of human alpha-1 proteinase inhibitor the Alpha One Foundation has already called on the 
Minister to intervene.  This has attracted a certain amount of media attention. For details see 
http://www.alpha1.ie/news-events/latest-news/289-decision-not-to-fund-respreeza. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
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c. International Nonproprietary Names. 
d. The Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio is reported in this column. It is the ratio of the 
incremental costs of the medicine divided by the incremental QALY due to the medicine. 
Only NCPE’s preferred estimate(s) are included.  
e. In some cases the net and the gross are the same, since there is no displaced treatment cost 
offsets associated with the uptake the medicine being assessed. 
f. In some instances the medicine might be compared to more than one alternative, resulting 
in more than one QALY estimate.  Only the NCPE’s preferred estimate(s) is included. 
g. For use for children with cystic fibrosis aged 2 years and older and weighing less than 25kg 
who have one of the relevant gating (class III) mutations in the CFTR gene. 
h. For treatment of locally advanced or metastatic non squamous NSCLC after prior 
chemotherapy in adults. 
Source: NCPE. 
If the NCPE recommends against listing, the HSE and the supplier may enter into 
negotiations concerning the price and any other associated conditions for acceptance.  
When agreement is reached the price is not always revealed.91 In such instances it may form 
part of a confidential Patient Access Scheme (PAS). 
It is not unreasonable, however, to assume that the implied QALY at the negotiated price 
will exceed €45,000.  For example, in the case of ipilimumab (Yervoy) the NCPE 
recommended on 2 September 2011 against reimbursement on the basis that the QALY was 
€147,899 at the submitted price.  Notwithstanding this recommendation, after much public 
discussion and negotiations between the HSE and the supplier, ipilimumab was added to the 
Reimbursement List in September 2013 at a price implying a QALY of €116,000, or more 
than twice the €45,000 threshold.92  
The application of these provisions and principles does not, however, lead to a simple yes or 
no in terms of the HSE accepting the maximum price proposed by a supplier as appropriate. 
Rather judgments are made by the HSE concerning the QALY, the budgetary impact and 
other factors mentioned in the Health Act 2013 (Box 1) as to the appropriate 
reimbursement price.  As a result there is often an extensive negotiation between the HSE 
and the supplier which on occasion is played out in the media, particularly when the 
                                                     
91
 For example, for the medicine Orencia, which was subject to a NCPE HTA, commencing 2 July 2013 and 
completed on 11 November 2013, the outcome was: “Reimbursement not recommended at the submitted 
price.” This outcome reflected the NCPE’s finding that the most plausible QALY was €79,510, well above the 
€45,000 threshold used by the NCPE.  However, the NCPE report that in November 2015, two years later, that 
“The HSE has approved reimbursement following confidential price negotiations.” For details see 
http://www.ncpe.ie/drugs/abatacept-orencia/. Accessed 23 May 2017.   
92
 Barry (2014, slides 19-20) and http://www.ncpe.ie/drugs/ipilimumab-yervoy/.  Accessed 23 May 2017. 
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beneficiaries of a new medicine perceive it to their advantage to make a public issue of the 
listing decision.93 
A comparison with the 2012-2015 agreement 
There are four important differences between the 2012-2015 agreement and the 
Agreement. First, five additional Member States are added to the list of Nominated States 
used to determine the average maximum original ex-factory price of a new medicine 
submitted by the supplier to the HSE. This is part of a longer term trend of adding more 
Member States to the list of Nominated States.94  Second, the approach to setting the price 
has arguably changed with the passage of the Health Act 2013, which contains specified 
criteria, which were set out in Box 1. Third, the cost-effectiveness procedures, which are a 
relatively recent addition to setting the original price of new medicines,95 are outlined in 
much greater detail. Fourth, the cost effectiveness threshold that existed in the 2012-2015 
agreement has been eliminated or at least attenuated.  We consider each in turn.  
                                                     
93
 This occurred with respect to lumacaftor/ivacaflor (Orkambi).  The NCPE recommended against 
reimbursement on 1 June 2016.  The QALY was €649,624; the five year budget impact was estimated to be 
€391.9 million. (For details see: http://www.ncpe.ie/drugs/lumacaftorivacaftor-orkambi/. Accessed 23 May 
2017). Subsequent to the NCPE report there has been considerable press coverage of the negotiations 
between the HSE and the supplier, with contributions by the Minister for Health and a representative body for 
the beneficiaries of the medicine, Cystic Fibrosis Ireland (CFI). CFI held a number of demonstrations in support 
of adding Orkambi to the Reimbursement List. In May 2017 the HSE (2017) announced that an agreement had 
been reached for this to occur, but with the details still to be finalised.  It is not clear if Orkambi will be funded 
from the HSE’s budget or whether a letter has been sent to the DoH from the HSE concerning funding.  When a 
government spokeswoman was asked where the funding would come from for Orkambi - the HSE or new 
monies - she refused to answer claiming, somewhat improbably, that this was “commercially sensitive” (Cullen, 
2017). 
94 The linking of Irish pharmaceutical prices to those in foreign markets (i.e. Nominated States) has featured 
since the 1983-1985 agreement.  In clause 2 of that agreement the benchmark was UK prices due to the fact 
that “the great majority of drugs and medicines used in the health service originate in the United Kingdom.” In 
clause 9.2 of the 1990-92 agreement the benchmark changed: the price of a new medicine  “shall not exceed ... 
the lesser of the currency adjusted UK Wholesale Price and the average of the currency adjusted wholesale 
prices in the following EC States, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.” In clauses 5.2 and 
5.7 of the 2006-2010 agreement the benchmark for a new medicine was the average currency adjusted price 
in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Finland and Austria. Hence the 
importance of the UK as a benchmark has decreased and reference pricing captures to a greater extent the 
European price of a new medicine as more and more Member States are added to the list of Nominated 
States. 
95
 The right of the HSE to “to assess new and existing technologies (pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and devices) 
that may be high in cost or have a significant budget impact on the Irish healthcare system” was first included 
in clause 4.3 of the 2006-2010 agreement.  Such assessments were to be “conducted with the existing agreed 
Irish Healthcare Technology Assessment [HTA] Guidelines.” Clause 4.3 of the 2012-2015 agreement used 
similar language, but also contained “Annex 1: Principles and Process for the Reimbursement of New 
Medicines in Ireland.”(Principles and Process).  
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The Agreement added five countries to the list of nine Nominated States in the 2012-2015 
agreement: Greece; Italy; Portugal; Sweden; and Luxembourg. As the DoH (2016a) note the 
list includes some Member States that typically have lower prices such as Greece.  However, 
it is unlikely that adding these five Member States will influence the price of new medicines. 
Ireland is an earlier adopter of new medicines.96  Such medicines are initially available in 
higher priced Member States such as Germany or UK rather than (say) Greece.  This reflects 
a so-called launch sequence strategy by suppliers, which is “used to delay or avoid launching 
new drugs in countries with lower prices ...”97  
Under the Agreement the supplier submits a maximum original ex-factory price, which is 
then subject to a NCPE Rapid Review and possibly a full HTA. If the cost per QALY is above 
€45,000/QALY threshold and/or the net budget impact is substantial then NCPE 
recommends against adding to the Reimbursement List and the HSE may enter into 
negotiations as to the price.  However, it is the HSE which makes the decision concerning 
price and reimbursement, guided by the Agreement, the NCPE evaluation and the legislative 
underpinning of the Health Act 2013. 
An examination of the 2012-2015 agreement suggests that a similar procedure was in place 
although the description of the procedure in this agreement appears to be somewhat 
different.98 While it is the case that the Health Act 2013 gives the HSE a legal basis for 
considerations of cost-effectiveness and budget impact, it appears that these factors were 
as relevant in assessing new medicines submitted under the earlier agreement.99  Hence the 
approach to setting the price of new medicines has arguably remained largely unchanged, 
except perhaps with respect to the threshold cost per QALY as discussed below.  
                                                     
96
 McCullagh & Barry (2016, p. 3), Toumi et al (2014, p. 99) and European Commission (2009, Figure 36, p. 
152).  However, more recently the IPHA has claimed that the reimbursement process is lengthening in Ireland 
(McDonagh, 2017).  
97
 Toumi et al (2014, p. 27, but see also pp. 31-2). 
98
 Clause 5.2 of the 2012-2015 agreement states that the original price of a new medicine will be the average 
price in the Nominated States or as set out in Annex 1 of that agreement, Principles and Process which, says 
that the new medicines that do not require a HTA or those which receive a positive HTA outcome will receive 
pricing approval either at the lower of the price submitted for the HTA or the average of the Nominated States.  
However, it is not clear how the price submitted for the HTA is estimated.  One interpretation is that it is the 
price resulting in a QALY of equal to or less than €45,000. 
99
 For a discussion see McCullagh & Barry (2016). 
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The Agreement sets out in much greater detail the cost-effectiveness procedures and 
principles than the 2012-2015 agreement. In the latter case these procedures and principles 
are set out in the one page Annex 1, Principles and Process.100  
The most striking difference between the Principles and Process and the Assessment 
Principles is the treatment of the threshold QALY. In the Principles and Process it is stated 
specifically at point 5 that “The QALY threshold to be used in the HTA process is €45, 000,” 
but with the qualification at point 11 that for “exceptional products” that exceed the 
€45,000 threshold “for a variety of reasons,” may be processed after discussions with the 
HSE, DoH and relevant clinicians.101  
As noted above the Agreement contains no reference or discussion of the relevant QALY 
threshold except for Table 2, although, somewhat paradoxically, the NCPE continues to use 
this threshold.  The Agreement does not state, for example, that the €45,000/QALY 
threshold can be exceeded in exceptional circumstances.   
It could thus be argued that the 2012-2015 agreement placed a firmer constraint on the 
QALY threshold than the Agreement with the result that original new medicine prices will be 
higher than they otherwise would be under the Agreement.  On the other hand, the 
€45,000/QALY threshold in the 2012-2015 agreement might have led suppliers to use this as 
a floor rather than a ceiling, with the result that the lack of a cost-effectiveness threshold in 
the Agreement gives the HSE greater flexibility in the pricing of new medicines.  However, 
based on available information, we are unable to distinguish between these two views. 
Given the similarity in determining the price of new medicines under the Agreement and the 
2012-2015 agreement, we conclude that Agreement will not result in any additional savings 
compared with the 2012-2015 agreement counterfactual.  Furthermore, no savings are 
attributed by the DoH in Table 1 to the Agreement in the pricing of new medicines under 
the no agreement counterfactual. 
 
 
                                                     
100
 See also clause 4.3 (“Pharmacoeconomic Assessment Prior to Reimbursement,” of the 2012-2015 
agreement. 
101
 This interpretation of the threshold is confirmed by Hennessy (2015, p. 3). 
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Discussion 
New medicine prices set the benchmark for expenditure on medicines and the base for 
subsequent price reductions.  As noted above the price of new medicines is anticipated to 
put considerable pressure of the HSE’s medicine budget over the period covered by the 
Agreement. Nevertheless, none of the suggestions and recommendations concerning ways 
in which such prices could be reduced is reflected in the Agreement.  Therefore, it seems 
relevant to ask why so little changed in the Agreement. 
The suppliers of new medicines desire to keep prices high in Ireland because, according to 
an executive of a leading pharmaceutical supplier writing to the Taoiseach in 2012, prices in 
Ireland are used to set prices in 11 other European countries and up to 37 additional 
countries worldwide.102  Hence if the list or posted price declines in Ireland then this has 
adverse repercussions for pharmaceutical firms across EU and non-EU markets.   
The Minister for Health in announcing the Agreement stated that  
“The Government wants to ensure that Irish patients continue to have access 
to new and innovative medicines and that Ireland remains at the forefront of 
its European peers in terms of early access to medicines in an affordable 
manner within available resources.”103 
If Ireland wishes to be in the forefront of new medicine adoption then prices need to be 
high or else the launch sequence strategy of suppliers will place Ireland further down the 
pecking order to receive a new medicine.  This is, of course, a tension with the goal of 
affordable prices. 
One way in which the suppliers desire for a high price for a new medicine and the desire of 
the Minister for Health for early adoption can be matched, while at the same lowering the 
State’s medicines budget, is to find alternative methods of effectively lowering prices, but 
leaving the list or posted prices unchanged. In this connection the increase in rebates in the 
Agreement, accounting for more than a third of the €600 million savings, is one obvious way 
in which the circle can be squared.  As a recent European Union publication noted, while 
                                                     
102
 Brick et al (2013a, p. 25).  
103
 DoH (2016a). 
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Member States such as Ireland gets the benefit of the rebate other Member States “do not 
benefit from the lower prices since they refer to undiscounted higher prices.”104 
Future Policy on Pricing New Medicines 
The current process for setting new medicine prices lacks predictability, transparency 
accountability resulting in a substantial degree of discretion by the HSE concerning 
reimbursement decisions.105  The airwaves and newspapers are frequently filled with 
patient groups demanding that the HSE fund this medicine or that medicine.106  Elected 
representatives press for new medicines to be added to the Reimbursement List, by for 
example, raising the issue in the Dail.107  There is a danger that reimbursement decisions are 
made on the basis of those who shout or lobby the loudest.   
This lack of clarity, especially with respect to the cost effectiveness threshold and the 
criteria for when this threshold should be exceeded, places great pressure on the HSE in 
making decisions concerning reimbursement. The HSE is put into an invidious position in 
making such decisions, but arguably without sufficient guidance. 
This has been apparent for some time.108 In considering whether or not ivacaftor should be 
reimbursed in 2013 – the NCPE’s evaluation determined at the submitted price the QALY 
varied between €449,035 and €855,437109- the Drugs Group, HSE, in its somewhat 
understated advice to the HSE stated that,110 
“Although it may be unpalatable to society to acknowledge this, a positive 
reimbursement decision might ultimately have implications (opportunity 
costs) for other social services which might be provided (including health 
                                                     
104
 Volger (2015, p. 36). 
105
 Compared, for example, with the reason regulatory decision making processes of the Commission for 
Energy Regulation or the merger decisions of the Competition and Consumer Protection Commission.  
106
 See for example the cases referred to in footnotes 91 and 93 and associated text in the first case. 
107
 For example, the discussion on Okambi which was raised during leader’s questions on 1 March 2017; see 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/takes/dail2017030100003
?opendocument. Accessed 23 May 2017.  
108
 In addition to the example discussed in the text see Hennessy (2015, Appendix Vii, pp. 22-25) with respect 
to eculizumab (Soliris).  
109
For details see: http://www.ncpe.ie/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Ivacaftor-Summary.pdf. Accessed 23 
May 2017.  
110
 Letter from Director General Designate, HSE to the Minister for Health, ’Re: ivacaftor (Kalydeco) for 
treatment of Cystic Fibrosis.’ 31 January 2013.  The quotes from the letter are taken from Brick et al (2013, p. 
28).  
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services).  Some of those other health services would be highly cost effective 
to support.” 
It continued, 
 “The Drugs Group decided that it does not have a formal understanding of 
societal views as to guide it in decision making on such issues.  On balance the 
group felt that society would like that the medicine be funded given the 
possibility of significant survival benefits. The group recognises that other 
international authorities have arrived at the same conclusion.” 
One option for resolving the HSE’s dilemma would be for it to review the appropriate cost 
effective threshold and the factors to be used the threshold should be exceeded. This could 
then be used as basis for consultation.  The outcome would be to provide the HSE with 
robust guidance on precisely how it should interpret the legislative criteria with respect to 
cost-effectiveness.  
It is not uncommon for those charged with administering law to issue such guidance after 
consultation.111 Unless such an action is taken decisions over new medicine reimbursement 
will continue to be played out in the public with the possibility that those who can shout the 
loudest or lobby most effectively being the winners. 
We will return to this issue in ‘Implications.’  Suffice to say at this stage, as noted above, the 
HSE has the authority under the Agreement, after consultation with the IPHA, to review the 
Assessment Principles.  In other words, reform in the pricing of new medicines does not 
have to wait until the expiry of the Agreement in 2020. 
Annual Ex-Factory Price Realignment of Patent-Protected and Off-Patent Exclusive 
Medicines 
Agreement provisions112 
The ex-factory price of patent-protected medicines and off-patent exclusive medicines113 
shall not increase over the term of the Agreement.114  The price of such medicines can only 
                                                     
111
 This is the case, for example, with respect to competition policy, both at the level of the Member State and 
the European Commission. 
112
 Clauses 5, 7.1.3 and 8.1.4 of the Agreement.   
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be realignment downwards over the course of the Agreement: on 1 August 2016 and 
thereafter on 1 July of each subsequent year to 2019.  The ex-factory prices for the purposes 
of realignment are determined by taking average ex-factory price for those Member States 
in which the medicine is available across the basket of fourteen Nominated States115 
specified in the Agreement as of 1 May prior to the realignment in August or July.  
Annual realignments thus apply to medicines for which the supplier has no competition.  It 
is the exclusive supplier, irrespective of whether or not the patent is extant.  The provision is 
likely to be particularly relevant to new medicines, especially those that where the medicine 
was not available in any of the Nominated States when it was initially listed in Ireland.  
There is an expectation that as a new medicine becomes more widely available across the 
Nominated States that it will face downward revisions in price. 
Implementation 
The first realignment under the Agreement occurred on 1 August 2016.  The HSE (2016b) 
published on-line the ex-factory price of each individual medicine by dosage form and 
strength before and after the realignment.  We characterise the realignment in two ways: 
first, for the leading 10 GMS medicines subject to realignment (Table 4); and second, for the 
leading 10 HTD medicines subject to realignment (Table 5).  The medicines were ranked by 
medicine cost to the HSE in 2015. 
We do not have information on the sales or volume of each dosage form and strength of 
medicines subject to realignment. Hence we present in Tables 4 and 5, for a given medicine, 
the average, maximum and minimum price declines for the dosage forms and strengths 
available for a particular medicine.  
The 10 leading GMS medicines subject to ex-factory price realignment on 1 August 2016 
accounted for 16.7% of total GMS ingredient cost in 2015.116 The downward price 
realignments, presented in Table 4, varied between 14% and 34% for eight of the 10 
                                                                                                                                                                     
113
 Exclusive off-patent medicines: for a non-biologic medicine where a generic medicine is not available for 
supply; and, for a biologic medicine there is no biosimilar medicine available for supply. 
114
 Subject to some limited exceptions. 
115
 These were defined above in footnote 69. 
116
 HSE (2016a, Table 43, pp. 164-166).  The denominator is the total ingredient cost for GMS products which 
also includes clinical nutritional products and diagnostic products. 
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medicines, with the exception of tiotropium bromide (7.7%) and denosumab (4.4%).  Even 
the minimum declines exceeded 10% in seven of the 10 medicines. 
Table 4: Ex-Factory Price Realignments,a Leading 10 GMS Patent Protected and Off-Patent 
Exclusive Medicines,b 1 August 2016, Ireland. 
INNc Brand   Dosage 
forms & 
strengths 
(Number)d 
Price  
Average 
(%) 
Declines 
Max 
(%) 
 
Min 
(%) 
pregablin Lyrica 6 23.8 28.6 12.1 
salmeterol + fluticasone Seretide 6 16.9 18.8 11.8 
formoterol +  budesonide Symbicort 3 16.5 20.7 10.4 
tiotropium bromide Spiriva 3 7.1 10.3 1.6 
denosumabf Xgeva 1 4.4 - - 
olanzapine Zpadhera 3 14.7 16.0 13.3 
aripipozole Abilify 1 14.0 - - 
duloxetine Cymbalta, Yentreve 4 28.6 28.7 28.6 
levetiracetam Keppra 6 34.0 37.3 17.1 
fentanyle Durogesic, Instanyl 11 14.2 27.7 3.3 
a. Under Clause 5.2 of the Agreement. 
b. The 10 leading GMS medicines, by ingredient cost, 2015, subject to price realignment on 1 
August 2016. 
c. International Nonproprietary Names. 
d. The total number listed in the HSE data source. 
e. The average decline for Durogesic was 26.0%  (N=5); for Instanyl, 4.3% (N=6). 
f. Biologic medicine. 
Source: HSE (2016a, Table 43, pp. 164-66; Table 2016b). 
 
Turning now to the leading 10 HTD medicines subject to realignment, these accounted for 
48% of HSE expenditure on HTD ingredient cost in 2015, with adalimumab alone accounting 
for 18.5%.117  The price declines for HTD medicines, in comparison with the GMS, are 
modest, varying, on average, between 0.7% and 6.5% (Table 5). In no case does the average 
price decrease reach double digits; indeed, if attention is paid to the maximum price 
decrease in only one case does it exceed 10% and then only by half a percentage point.  
Price data for two of the top 10 HTD medicines is not available due to confidentiality 
agreements between the supplier and the HSE. 
 
 
                                                     
117
 HSE (2016a, Table 49, pp. 179-184).  Note the percentage for the top 10 HTD medicines includes all these 
medicines. 
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Table 5: Ex-Factory Price Realignments,a Leading Ten HTD Patent Protected and Off-Patent 
Exclusive Medicines,b 1 August 2016, Ireland. 
INNc Brand   Dosage forms 
& strengths 
(Number)d 
Price  
Average 
(%) 
Declines 
Max 
(%) 
 
Min 
(%) 
adalimumabe Humira 4 1.3 2.0 0.5 
ivacaftor Kaldeco -  No pricing information 
fingolimod Gilenya 3 0.7 1.8 0.1 
lenalidomidee Relimid 4 1.4 1.7 1.2 
interferon beta 1ae  Avonex, Rebif 10 6.5 10.5 3.3 
golimumabe Simponi - No pricing information 
pegfilgrastime Neulasta 1 4.7 - - 
certolizumab pegole Cimzia 1 3.1 - - 
tacrolimus Advagraf, Propoic 6 2.9 4.3 0.4 
imatinib Gilvec 2 0.4 0.4 0.3 
a. Under Clause 5.2 of the Agreement. 
b. The 10 leading HTD medicines, by ingredient cost, 2015, subject to price realignment on 1 
August 2016. 
c. International Nonproprietary Names. 
d. The total number listed in the HSE data source. 
e. Biologic medicine. 
Source: HSE (2016a, Table 49, pp. 179-184; 2016b). 
The difference between the GMS and HTD schemes may reflect the emphasis in the HTD on 
newer medicines for which diffusion across the Nominated States may be at a less advanced 
stage than for older less expensive GMS medicines.  In 2014, for example, 98% of HTD 
expenditure was on medicines which were still patent protected.118 According to the HSE “in 
the future, the expectation is that new medicines will in the main be in the” HTD.119  Indeed, 
for some of the HTD medicines, in view of their cost, the optimal strategy of suppliers may 
be to only gradually roll out their introduction across the Nominated States.   
A comparison with the 2012-2015 agreement 
The Agreement differs in two important respects from the 2012-2015 agreement with 
respect to the ex-factory pricing of medicines for which there is exclusive supply, 
irrespective of whether or not the patent is extant: the increased frequently of price 
                                                     
118
 Callaghan (2015, p. 15). 
119
 Cited in Joint Committee on Health & Children (2015, p. 25). The medicines such as ipilimumab and 
lumacaflor/ivacaflor (which were referred to above) whether approved for reimbursement or not, come within 
the ambit of the HTD.   
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realignments over the course of the agreement;120 and, the increase by five in the number 
of Member States included in the basked of Nominated States,121 including some such as 
Greece, that typically charge lower prices.  The analysis here concentrates on the first 
difference. 
Under the 2012-2015 agreement: 
 all patent-protected medicines placed on the market prior to 1 September 2006 and 
post-patented medicines placed on the market prior to 1 September 2006 without a 
identical pharmaceutical form for sale,122 will be realigned downwards only, to the  
average price in the Nominated States in which it was available on 1 November 
2012; and, 
 any medicine introduced after 1 September 2006 will be realigned downwards only, 
to the average price in the Nominated States in which it was available on 1 January 
2013.  
The 2012-2015 agreement has one set of realignments (2012 and 2013, depending on 
whether or not he medicine was introduced before or after 1 September 2006), while the 
Agreement has four sets of realignments (2016, 2017, 2018, 2019).  Hence the additional 
impact or effect of the Agreement is the three realignments subsequent to the initial 
realignment in 2016.  In assessing the impact of the Agreement in providing savings the 
initial 2016 realignment should thus be regarded since they are part of the 2012-2015 
agreement counterfactual.  
According to the DoH one third of the estimated overall savings of €660 million or €205 
million is due to the annual realignment of medicines with exclusive supply and the addition 
five Member States to the basket of Nominated States (Table 1).  On the assumption that 
the €205 million is spread equally across the four annual price realignments, then the 
savings in 2016 will be €48 million and €52 million for each of the next three annual 
                                                     
120
 Clause 7, 2012-2015 agreement. 
121
 Greece, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and Luxembourg. 
122
 Biologics would not have identical pharmaceutical forms since biosimilars are not considered 
interchangeable under the Health Act 2013. 
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adjustments.123  However, as argued above, the savings for 2016 would have occurred had 
the 2012-2015 agreement been replicated in place of the Agreement.  Thus additional 
savings due to price realignment should be €157 million, not €205 million. 
There are good grounds for arguing, however, that the savings under the price realignments 
are likely to be front loaded, skewed towards 2016, rather than 2017-2019. Hence the 
savings due to the Agreement are likely to be less than €157 million.    
Prior to the price realignment of 1 August 2016, the price of patent-protected and off-
patent exclusive medicines had not been adjusted since 2012-2013 in accordance with the 
2012-2015 agreement.  Other things being equal, we would expect that price realignment 
after three to four years (i.e. on the 1 August 2016) would yield greater savings than annual 
(i.e. on 1 July 2017, 2018 and 2019) price realignments.   
One way of quantifying the impact of this front loading is to assume that the savings of €205 
million reflect price changes since 2014, given that no realignments occurred since 2012-
2013. If annual realignments had occurred starting in 2014, terminating in 2019, this is 
equivalent to annual savings of €34.2 million per annum over the six realignments.  
However, the 2014 and 2015 realignments did not take place under the 2012-2015 
agreement. The first realignment was in 2016, which would have reflected not only the 2016 
realignment but also the forgone 2014 and 2015 realignments, or €102.5 million in total . On 
these assumptions the Agreement’s savings due to price realignment should be 
approximately €100 million. 
There other evidence to suggest that initial reduction due to price realignment is greater 
than subsequent realignments. In the 2006-2010 agreement there was provision for 
realignments in 2008 and 2010.  In earlier research the price of all new medicines 
introduced in 2006, 2007 and 2008 were realigned using the average price in the Nominated 
States in which they were available in 2008 and 2010.124  The evidence suggested that prices 
dropped by 10% in the initial two year period and to a lesser extent thereafter.  
                                                     
123
 Strictly speaking the first realignment is for 11 months while the subsequent three are for a year. Hence 
instead of four annual savings of €51.25 million, the 2016 saving should be €48 million, each subsequent year 
€52 million. 
124
 Brick et al (2013a, pp. 21-23). 
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In sum, the annual realignment of the price of medicines with exclusive supply is likely to 
lower medicine prices over 2016-2020: under the no agreement counterfactual by €205 
million, the 2012-2015 agreement counterfactual by €100 million.     
Discussion 
The Agreement’s annual price realignment is a marked improvement over the 2012-2015 
agreement, resulting in considerable additional savings.  The change follows earlier research 
and recommendations that there should be more frequent price alignments than had 
characterised previous agreements between the State and the IPHA. The addition of some 
other Member States to the list of Nominated States is also likely to lead to lower prices.  In 
terms of future increased savings one option would be to switch to using the lowest price in 
the basket of Nominated States rather than the average.125 
Pricing of Patent-Expired, Non-Exclusive (Excluding Biologic) Medicines 
Agreement provisions126 
Medicines, excluding biologic, for which the patent has expired and for which a “Generic 
Medicine” is “Available for Supply”: 
 on 1 August 2016 each existing such medicine shall be reduced to 50% of the 
“Original Ex-Factory Price” set by the HSE for a new medicine;  
 if a medicine becomes a patent-expired, non-exclusive medicine after 1 August 2016, 
then it shall also be reduced in price by 50% of its “Original Ex-Factory Price”; and,   
These provisions shall not apply to patent protected and off-patent medicines not declared 
interchangeable subject to annual ex-factory price realignments outlined above or to similar 
provisions in earlier agreements. 
A Generic Medicine is defined in the Agreement as “medicinal products as defined in Article 
10(2)(b) of EC Directive 2001/83/EC in respect of which a Marketing Authorisation has been 
issued by the HPRA or the European Commission.”127 However, it should be noted that not 
                                                     
125
 For further discussion of this see Brick et al (2013a, pp. 21-25). 
126
 Clause 7 of the Agreement. 
127
 Clause 1 of the Agreement. 
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all generic medicines are declared interchangeable by the HPRA, although clearly there is a 
considerable degree of overlap.128 
Available for Supply means a medical product that has received the relevant EU or Irish 
marketing authorisation and “which is available for sale and supply in the State.”129 
The price reductions are from the “Original Ex-Factory Price,” which is defined as “the ex-
factory price at which it [the medicine] was first approved for reimbursement or supply by 
the HSE, its predecessor(s) or a Relevant Agency.”130 In other words, the 50% price reduction 
does not use the price of the medicine when the generic enters the market but rather the 
price of the medicine when it first approved for reimbursement, which is likely to be a 
decade or more prior to the entry of the generic. 
A comparison with the 2012-2015 agreement 
Under the 2012-2015 agreement medicines for which the patent had expired where a 
generic was available the price first fell by 30%-40% of the original ex-factory price before 
falling further to 50% of the original ex-factory price a year later.131  In other words, under 
the 2012-2015 agreement in the first year prices fell by 30%-40% rather than 50% of the 
original price. Thus the HSE benefits under the Agreement, compared to the 2012-2015 
agreement, by the bringing forward by one year the reduction to 50% of the original price.  
DoH attributes €115 million savings due to reductions in patent expired medicines for which 
a generic is available (Table 1). Two separate components are identified by DoH. 
First, Clause 6 of the 2012-2015 agreement results in savings of €90 million.  As noted 
above, this clause led to a reduction in the original price of between 30% and 40% when the 
generic appeared on the market.  It is difficult to see how this can be considered as an 
additional saving due to the Agreement.  The reductions existed in the 2012-2015 
agreement and hence were part of the counterfactual – what would have happened without 
                                                     
128
 For further discussion see HPRA (2014). 
129
 Clause 1 of the Agreement. 
130
 Clause 1 of the Agreement. 
131
 Clause 6, 2012-2015 agreement. Note for patent expired medicines (with a generic available) whose prices 
were above 60% of the original price on 1 November 2012, the price shall be reduced to 60% of the original 
price on 1 November 2012; for medicines due to go off patent from 1 November 2012, the price will be 
reduced to 70% of the original price and then twelve months later to 50% of the original price.   
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the Agreement. Hence the €90 million should be discounted as a saving due to the 
Agreement. 
Second, the bringing forward by one year the 50% price reduction results in an estimated 
savings of €25 million or €4.25 million per annum.  This appears, on the face of it, as a 
genuine additional saving compared to the counterfactual.   
In sum, the savings attribute to Agreement’s provisions relating to the pricing of the 
originator’s brand or product once a generic appears are €115 million under the no 
agreement counterfactual and €25 million under the 2012-2015 agreement counterfactual.  
Discussion 
Under the Health Act 2013 the HSE sets a reference price for generic medicines which have 
been declared interchangeable by the HPRA.  As noted above the reference price is not set 
by reference to the originator’s price, but rather the price charged in other Member States. 
The available evidence – cited above under ‘Increasing generic penetration: the Health Act 
2013’ -  suggests that the price setting mechanism has resulted in a dramatic reduction in 
expenditure for medicines with a reference price.  This raises the issue of the relevance and 
necessity of Clause 7 of the Agreement. 
In the case of the first medicine for which a reference price was set, the DoH (2017) state 
that:  
“The first reference price for atorvastatin products was implemented on 1 
November 2013. This represents a major step in ensuring lower prices are 
paid for these medicines. The new reference prices for atorvastatin products 
— which are used to control cholesterol — means the HSE now pays 70% less 
for these products compared to May 2013. The reference price is at 15% of 
the pre-patent expiry price i.e. the price is 85% lower than the patented price 
of the original brand (Lipitor).” 
In other words, the 50% reduction from the ex-factory price in the Agreement does not 
appear to be binding for generic medicines which are declared interchangeable and for 
which a reference price has been set.  But how typical is atorvastatin? 
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We can address this issue further using an alternative method of determining the decline in 
price due to reference pricing in relation to the original price.  The results are presented in 
Table 6 for the fifteen leading GMS medicines, ranked by ingredient cost in 2013,132 which 
appeared on the initial list of medicines that the DoH/HSE wished to be priorised by the 
HPRA because they were considered as offering the greatest savings.133  These 15 medicines 
in 2013 accounted for 18.9% of GMS ingredient cost and nine of the leading 20 GMS 
products. The priority review was to be undertaken in the latter part of 2013 and the first 
quarter of 2014. 
For 2005 and 2015 for the sample of 15 leading medicines we estimate the average GMS 
cost per medicine: the total ingredient cost divided by the total number of prescriptions.134  
We take 2005, when, as far as we are aware, there were no generic medicines available for 
each of the 15 medicines, as indicative of the original price of the medicine.  This estimate 
will, of course, be biased downward as the medicine may have been available at a higher 
price prior to 2005.  However, the earliest year in the HSE data source is 2005. 
At the other extreme we use 2015.  This is the latest year for which such data is available 
from the HSE data source. Furthermore since the initial list of medicines to be reviewed with 
respect to interchangeability by the HPRA and a reference price set by the HSE would have 
taken place in 2013 and 2014, 2015 is the first year for which annual data would be able to 
capture the impact of reference pricing. 
There are a number of points that can be made in relation to Table 6.  First, in the case of 
atorvastatin the 85% reduction in the reference price compared to the original ex-factory 
price highlighted in the quote from the DoH (2017) is very close to the 87.7% reduction 
recorded in the table, which gives considerable confidence in the reliability of the tabular 
results.135 
 
                                                     
132
 HSE (2014, Table 46, pp. 192-194).  The source ranks the top 100 GMS medicines, which accounted for 75% 
of GMS ingredient cost. 
133
 HPRA (2014, p. 8).  Virtually all interchangeable medicines fall under GMS. 
134
 For example, for in 2005 the GMS paid €36,471,497 for 50,527,982 prescriptions resulting in an average 
cost of €35.55. 
135
 Reference prices are regularly reviewed and this may explain why in 2015 the reduction is 87.7% rather 
than 85%. 
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Table 6: Original and Reference Price, Average Ingredient Cost per Prescription, Leading 15 GMS 
Interchangeable Medicines,a 2005 & 2015, Ireland.  
INNb   Average Ingredient 
Cost per Prescription 
2005 
Original Price 
(1) 
  Average Ingredient 
Cost per Prescription 
2015 
Reference Price 
(2) 
Average Ingredient 
Cost Reductionc 
 (%) 
 
(3) 
atrovastatin €37.55 €4.61 87.7 
esomeprazole €41.59 €7.86 81.1 
olanzapine €117.39 €31.32 73.3 
omeprazole €49.03 €7.75 84.2 
rosuvastatin €29.95 €8.56 71.4 
lansoprazole €38.73 €6.52 83.2 
quetiapined  €60.58 €18.76 69.0 
pantoprazole €33.84 €6.52 80.7 
clopidogrel €54.45 €7.58 86.1 
pravastatin €41.55 €5.27 87.3 
perindopril €20.03 €5.98 70.1 
risperidone €63.33 €30.97 51.1 
ramipril €16.32 €3.62 77.8 
valsartan €24.06 €6.08 74.7 
losartan €27.40 €6.72 75.5 
a. The 15 leading GMS medicines, by ingredient cost, 2013, included in the initial list of 
medicines selected by the DoH/HSE for the HPRA to add to the list of interchangeable 
medicines. We were not able to find data for lercanidpine for 2005 or 2006 and hence 
omitted it from consideration. The HSE data source only provided data for the leading 100 
medicines. 
b. International Nonproprietary Names. 
c. Col 3=1 – ((Col(2)/Col(1)). 
d. 2006 was used, since quetiapine was not listed in the data source for 2005. 
Source: HPRA (2014, Table 2, p. 8); HSE (2006, Table 19.2, pp. 73-75; 2007, Table 19.2, pp. 74-76; 
2014, Table 46, pp. 192-194; 2016a, Table 42, pp. 161-163 & Table 43, pp. 164-166). 
Second, the reduction in the price of interchangeable medicines with a reference price is 
always, without exception, more than 50% of the original ex-factory price. In five of the 15 
cases the decline is 80% or greater, in 14 of the 15 the decline is 69% or greater.  In other 
words, under the reference pricing regime introduced under the Health Act 2013, prices of 
interchangeable medicines fall by more than 50%.  This suggests that for these medicines 
the provisions of the Agreement are irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, there may be a class (es) of medicines for which the Agreement provisions are 
relevant and savings can be attributed.   
First, generic medicines considered, for medical reasons, to be unsuitable for classification 
as interchangeable. However, if this is the case then it would seem unlikely that generic 
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suppliers of medicines would enter the market in the first place, since market penetration 
and returns would likely be quite low.  Nevertheless, for whatever reasons, some generic 
medicines may have been launched that fall into this category. 
Secondly, the HSE may not request the HPRA to review all medicines that are suitable for 
classification as interchangeable.  However, this does not appear to the case, with the list of 
interchangeable medicines growing by the day. Indeed, the DoH (2017) stated that “It is 
expected that 80% by value of the off-patent market for prescribed medicines will be subject 
to reference pricing by end Quarter 1 2015.”  Nevertheless there may be some low volume 
off patent medicines or low volume dosage forms/strengths of medicines that could be 
certified as interchangeable but where the resources needed by the HPRA and the HSE may 
not justify the inclusion of such medicines on the Interchangeable List.136 
Third, there is likely to be a lag between, on the one hand, the generic being available for 
supply (and hence triggering the 50% price reduction of the originator brand), and, on the 
other, the HPRA adding the active ingredient to the Interchangeable List and the HSE setting 
a reference price.  During the lag between the generic being available for supply and the 
setting of the reference price, bringing forward the 50% reduction results in savings 
attributed to the Agreement.137   
Fourth, under reference pricing if the medical practitioner writes “Do Not Substitute” across 
a GMS prescription for an interchangeable medicine then the brand named on the 
prescription must be dispensed.  Typically such prescriptions will be for the originator’s 
brand which may have developed a certain amount of brand loyalty; the greater the degree 
of product differentiation the more important will be such no substitution prescriptions. 
The important point for present purposes is that the brand is reimbursed not at the 
reference price, but the brand specific price.  The maximum for which is set under the 
Agreement.  However, as we have seen in the discussion of price realignments for medicines 
for which there is exclusive supply, prices under the various State/IPHA agreements mean 
                                                     
136
 It appears that for some medicines added to the Interchangeable List not all dosage forms and strengths are 
accorded a reference price. 
137
 Of course, account would need to be taken of the fact that originator’s product would likely have already 
fallen from the original ex-factory price due to various realignments.  See Table 4 for the record of realignment 
for leading GMS medicines. 
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that by the time a reference price has been set the originator’s price has already fallen 
substantially in relation to the original or initial price (Table 4).   
In any event we have limited data on the market share of “Do Not Substitute” prescriptions.  
In aggregate terms, in early 2016, the DoH (2016b, p. 26) reported that over 70% of the off-
patent market, by volume, was accounted for by generics. At the level of individual 
medicines, in October 2015, generics accounted for 95% by volume of donepezil,138 for 
memantine, over 85% of the tablet and around 55% of the oral solution.139 This does not 
mean, of course, that the remaining non-generic medicines fall into the “Do Not Substitute” 
category.  The patient, for example, may decide to pay for the original brand.  
In sum, the available evidence suggests that the major savings on generic medicines are due 
to reference pricing not the Agreement. This raises considerable doubts as to the relevance 
of Clause 7 of the Agreement, especially with respect to the straight reduction to 50%.  
Nevertheless, notwithstanding these doubts, there are enough lags and other factors to 
suggest that attributing €15 million to the Agreement is likely to be credible under the 2012-
2015 agreement counterfactual. 
Pricing of Patent-Expired, Non-Exclusive Biologic Medicines   
Agreement provisions140 
Biologic medicines141 for which a biosimilar142 medicine is “Available for Supply” (i.e. a 
patent-expired non-exclusive biologic medicine):  
 on 1 August 2016 shall be reduced to 80% of the “Original Ex-factory Price.” In other 
words, the biologic medicine will be priced to the State at a discount of 20% of the 
initial or original ex-factory price. 
                                                     
138
 For details see: http://www.hse.ie/eng/staff/PCRS/circulars/donepezilrefpricefeb16.pdf.  Accessed 23 May 
2017. 
139
 For details see: http://www.hse.ie/eng/staff/PCRS/circulars/memantinerefpriceApril16.pdf.  Accessed 23 
May 2017. 
140
 Clause 8 of the Agreement. 
141
 A biologic medicine is defined in Clause 1 of the Agreement as “Medicines which are biological medicinal 
products as defined in Annex 1 of Directive 2001/83/EEC in respect of which a Marketing Authorisation has 
been issued by the HPRA or the European Commission.” 
142
 A biosimilar medicine is defined in Clause 1 of the Agreement as “biological medicinal products which 
contain a version of the active substance of a Biologic Medicine and which are similar to other Biologic 
Medicines in terms of quality characteristics, biological activity, safety and efficacy and in respect of which a 
Marketing Authorisation has been issued by the HPRA or the European Commission.” 
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  after 1 August 2016 it shall be reduced “to 80% of the ex-factory price of that 
Biologic Medicine as of the 31st July 2016.”143   
 the supplier shall also pay the HSE a rebate of 12.5% of the value at the reduced 
price, irrespective of whether or not the patent-expired non-exclusive biologic 
medicine became available before or after 1 August 2016.144   
Patent-expired, non-exclusive biologic medicines are priced, directly and indirectly, at a 
discount of 30% to the original ex-factory price or the ex-factory price on 31 July 2016.145 
“Available for Supply” and “Original Ex-factory Price” were defined above. 
A couple of points can be made concerning the pricing of patent-expired, non-exclusive 
biologic medicines as compared with the pricing of patent-expired non-exclusive non-
biologic medicines.   
First, when a biosimilar medicine becomes available after 1 August 2016 the percentage 
price reduction for the corresponding biologic medicine is 30% from the price of the 
medicine on 31 July 2016, not the original ex-factory price.  However, the decline in price for 
biologic medicines from the original ex-factory price – as seen in Table 5 - appears to quite 
modest.   
Second, instead of a straight price reduction of 30%, the price of biologic for which a 
biosimilar becomes available for supply is achieved in part by a rebate.  Prices in Ireland are 
used to set prices in a number of other Member States and beyond.  Typically such prices do 
not include discounts and rebates. This may be the reason for the rebate rather than a 
straight price reduction. 
A comparison with the 2012-2015 agreement  
Under the 2012-2015 agreement there was no provision for price reductions on biosimilars.  
Price reductions only applied to “patent expired medicines where the identical 
pharmaceutical form of that medicine, approved by the Irish Medicines Board or European 
                                                     
143
 Clause 8.1.2 of the Agreement. 
144
 Clause 8.1.3 of the Agreement. 
145
 If the original price is €100, then the first reduction is to €80.  12.5% of €80 is €10, resulting in a price, 
including the rebate, of €70. 
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Commission, is available for prescription in the Schemes …”146 Biosimilars are explicitly 
excluded from such a definition.147 
DoH attribute €55 million savings due to reductions in patent expired biologic medicines for 
which a biosimilar is available (Table 1).  Savings of at least this magnitude, at first glance, 
are credible.  It has been estimated, for example, that over 2019-2020 six biologics will lose 
patent protection with sales in 2015 of €170 million: 30% is €51 million.148 
In sum, the €55 million savings is consistent with both the no agreement and 2012-2015 
agreement counterfactual. 
Discussion 
There are, however, serious concerns that the policy framework for the successful 
introduction, use and dissemination of biosimilars, in contrast to generics, is not in place. 
Hence the savings envisaged as a result of the Agreement may not be realised in full.  This 
lacuna is acknowledged by policymakers. Steps are being taken to address this problem. 
Suppliers of biosimilars will only enter the market, triggering the provisions of the 
Agreement, if they expect to make a positive return on their investment. To date the 
indications are that biosimilars have achieved extremely low market shares in Ireland.  
This is illustrated by the example of entanercept. In 2015 it accounted for €52.5 million or 
11.1% of HTD ingredient cost.149 Sales of the biosimilar, Benepali, in the final two months of 
2016 amounted to three packets, while the biologic brand, Enbrel, sold 10,000 packages.150 
Such a low market share is consistent with other evidence regarding biosimilar market 
penetration in Ireland.151 
Despite guidance from the HPRA (2014) and the NIMC (2016), there is little incentive for the 
medical practitioner to prescribe a biosimilar by name.  Time and effort is required to inform 
the patient of the proposed change from the biologic original brand.  Unlike generic, there is 
                                                     
146
 Clause 6, 2012-2015 agreement. 
147
 HSE (2016c). 
148
 The estimates are reported in Harris (2017). See also HSE (2016c). 
149
 HSE (2016a, Table 49, pp. 182-184). 
150
 Coyle (2017).  The corresponding numbers for insulin glargine were 18 and 12,172, respectively. 
151
 See, for example, IMS Health (2016). 
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no legal framework that permits the pharmacist to substitute a biosimilar.152  The patient 
has little or no incentive to switch to a biosimilar, since the HTD and GMS cover the cost of 
the medicine in full.  There is no copayment – as occurs for a generic – if the patient prefers 
a brand that is more expensive than the reference price.  
Recognising these problems, which have been highlighted by the suppliers of biosimilars,153 
the Minister for Health has promised a consultation paper in 2017 Q1 on the development 
of a National Biosimilar Policy, although the paper has, as yet, to be published. Issues to be 
considered include whether or not there should be pharmacy level substitution as occurs 
with generics.  No doubt the consultation paper will draw on the success of the use of 
biosimilars in other jurisdictions.  In particular the success of the use biosimilar for infliximab 
at University Hospital Southampton154 and in Norway and Denmark where the infliximab 
biosimilar reached market penetration levels as of April 2016 in excess of 90%.155 
Rebate on Sales 
Agreement provisions156 
Each supplier shall provide rebate to the HSE on the value of all medicines reimbursed by 
the HSE and relevant agencies including State-funded hospitals.  The rebate is set at 5.25% 
for sales between 1 June 2016 to 31 July 2018; 5.5% for the period 1 August 2018 to 31 July 
2020. 
The rebate does not apply to sales of patent expired and non-exclusive medicines, 
irrespective of whether or not they are biologic medicines. 
 
 
                                                     
152
 A Bill was introduced on 31 May 2016 to amend the Health Act 2013 to make biosimilars and biologics 
interchangeable medicines.  The bill, was entitled, Health (Pricing and Supply of Medical Goods) (Amendment) 
Bill 2016.  However, the Minister for Health felt while he agreed with the objective of the legislation, it would 
not in fact achieve its objective (Harris, 2017). 
153
 HEA (2015). 
154
 For details see, for example, http://pharmaphorum.com/news/uk-hospital-saving-80-000-per-month-using-
biosimilar-conference/# and https://www.ecco-ibd.eu/index.php/publications/congress-abstract-s/abstracts-
2016/item/dop029-outcomes-of-a-managed-switching-programme-changing-ibd-patients-established-on-
originator-infliximab-to-biosimilar-infliximab.html.  Accessed 23 May 2107. 
155
 See, for example, Welch (2016). 
156
 Clauses 9, 7.1.3, and 8.1.4 of the Agreement. 
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A comparison with the 2012-2015 agreement  
The rebate provisions of the Agreement marked an important break from the earlier 2012-
2015 agreement in two respects.157 First, the rebate is extended to all Relevant Agencies 
which includes hospitals. Under the 2012-2015 agreement the rebate only applied to 
community drug schemes.158 There was no rebate on medicine sales to hospitals.  Second, 
the magnitude of the rebate was increased from the 4% rebate in the 2012-2015 
agreement.159 The 4% rebate has been a longstanding feature of the agreements between 
the State and IPHA (and its earlier incarnations), first appearing in the 1969-71 
agreement.160 
DoH attributes €225 million savings due to rebates on sales (Table 1).  These savings are 
divided into three components: 
 €70 million due to the rebate on sales to hospitals of 5.25% rising to 5.5%; 
 €40 million due to extra rebate on community drug schemes of 1.25% rising to 1.5%; 
and, 
 €115 million due to the 4% rebate on community drug scheme sales. 
Rebates are the most important single source of savings attributed by DoH to the 
Agreement, accounting for more than a third of the overall figure of €600 million. 
While the savings due to the extension of rebates to hospitals and the increase in the rebate 
on community drug schemes are clearly additional, relative to the counterfactual of the 
2012-2015 agreement, the same cannot be said of the 4% rebate on community drug 
scheme sales. As noted above the 4% rebate goes back to the first agreement between the 
State and the representative body that was the predecessor of the IPHA - just under fifty 
years ago.  It is thus hard to argue that the savings due to the 4% rebate on community drug 
scheme sales should be considered additional. 
                                                     
157
 On the other hand under clause 6.1 the 2012-2015 agreement there was no rebate on patent expired 
medicines available for prescription. 
158
 Clause 9, 2012-2015 agreement. 
159
 Clause 9, 2012-2015 agreement.  The 4% rebate did not apply to patent expired medicines where the 
identical pharmaceutical form of the medicine was available in Ireland. This exemption was not included in the 
Agreement. 
160
 Clause 7, 1969-71 agreement.  Note this agreement was between the Pharmaceutical and Allied Industries 
Association and the DoH.  
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In sum, the Agreement clauses relating to rebates will likely result in savings of €110 million 
under the 2012-2015 agreement counterfactual, €225 million under the no agreement 
counterfactual.   
Discussion 
In the previous section it was argued that the rebate on the price of a biologic for which a 
biosimilar becomes available for supply may be used in part because it is a form of disguised 
price reduction that does not affect the posted or list price which is used by other Member 
States to set prices.  A similar argument also could be applied to hospital rebates and the 
increase in community drug schemes rebates that featured in the Agreement.  However, the 
longstanding 4% rebate dates back to 1969 when, at least for Ireland, there was no 
reference to the prices charged in other jurisdictions. Other factors must have caused the 
rebate.161  Hence it appears that the motivation for rebates may have changed over time. 
Continuity of Supply162 
Under the Agreement suppliers must notify the HSE of discontinuation of a medicine: at 
least twelve months where there is “no reimbursable therapeutic alternative for approved 
indications;” and, at least three months “where there is a reimbursable therapeutic 
alternative for approved indications.”163 Similar provisions existed in the 2012-2015 
agreement.164 
IMPLICATIONS 
Overall Savings Due to the Agreement 
The critical issue in estimating the likely savings from the Agreement is the appropriate 
counterfactual.  In other words, but for the Agreement, how would the pricing of medicines, 
                                                     
161
 It may, for example, be a simple and straightforward of method of reducing medicine expenditure. 
162
 Clause 11 of the Agreement. 
163
 Clause 11.2(b) of the Agreement. Where a supplier transfers a Marketing Authorisation to another supplier 
that is likely to materially change supply arrangements the supplier shall notify the HSE at least three months 
before the transfer and inform the new holder of the terms of the Agreement. 
164
 Clause 10, 2012-2015 agreement.  One difference between the Agreement and the 2012-2015 agreement 
was that the latter contained the following clause, “10.5 Where a supplier is in breach of this Clause [10], it will 
be required to either source and supply alternative equivalent products at the same price as the unavailable 
product or reimburse the HSE any difference in cost arising from the shortage.”   
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including rebates, be determined? What is required is a credible counterfactual benchmark 
against which to estimate the savings flowing from the Agreement. 
The €600 million savings billed by the Minister for Health as a result of the Agreement over 
2016-2020 were benchmarked against a counterfactual characterised with: 
 no agreement between the State and the IPHA, despite the fact such agreements 
have existed since 1969; and, 
 no use of the powers of the Health Act 2013 to mitigate the lack of an agreement, 
despite the fact that the State threatened to use these powers during the 
negotiations leading to the Agreement. 
This benchmark is the no agreement counterfactual. 
An alternative counterfactual benchmark is the status quo.  In other words, the 2012-2015 
agreement is replicated starting in 2016 and its three year term extended for one year to 
2020. 
The choice of counterfactual is not some academic esoteric issue.  It matters. Under the no 
agreement counterfactual the estimate savings are, of course, €600 million, while under the 
status quo counterfactual the savings are less than half of this amount, €290 million (Table 
7).  However, as noted above, both of these estimates are subject to a number of 
qualifications and caveats. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these the conclusion concerning 
the different magnitudes of the two counterfactuals remains unaltered. 
The issue thus becomes which counterfactual is more appropriate for estimating the savings 
due to the Agreement.  It is suggested that there are five sets of reasons for preferring the 
status quo option. 
First, in other instances where counterfactuals are employed for analogous purposes – from 
merger analysis to NCPE evaluations – the counterfactual is the status quo.  This does not 
mean, of course, that in some cases an alternative credible counterfactual might be 
appropriate.  However, as discussed below under point five the no agreement 
counterfactual does not appear to be credible. 
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Table 7: Estimates of State/IPHA Agreement’s Savings, Two Counterfactuals, Public 
Purchases, 2016-2020 
Source of Savings  
(Clause of Agreement or 2012-2015 agreement) 
Cumulative Savings 2016-
2020 
(€m) 
Counterfactual 
No 
Agreementa 
Status 
Quob 
Original Price of New Medicine (Clause 6 & Assessment 
Principles) 
None None 
Annual Ex-Factory Price Alignments on Patent Protected 
and Exclusive Off-Patented Medicines (Clauses 5, 7.1.3 & 
8.1.4)c 
 205 100 
Pricing of Patent-Expired, Non-Exclusive (Excluding 
Biologic) Medicines (Clause 7) 
  
      Existing Clause 6 (of 2012-2015 agreement) 90 - 
      Price Reduction Straight to 50%d 25 25 
Pricing of Patent-Expired, Non-Exclusive Biologic Medicines 
(Clause 8)  
      Biologics less 30% 
55 55 
Rebate on Sales (Clause 9)   
     Clause 9 (of the 2012-2015 agreement)e 115 - 
     Hospital Rebate (5.25% rising to 5.5%)f 70 70 
     Extra Rebate (1.25% rising to 1.5%)f 40 40 
Total 600 290 
a. The counterfactual assumes no agreement between the State/IPHA and that the State does 
not mitigate this by employing the powers of the Health Act 2013. 
b. The counterfactual is the 2012-2015 agreement extended by one year.  
c. “Extended Reference Basket & Price Realignments” in the DoH documentation. 
d. “Clause 7 (previous Clause 6) straight to 50%” in DoH documentation. Instead of 30% in year 
1 and 50% in year 2, the 50% reduction occurs in year 1 under the Agreement. 
e. “PCRS Rebate” in DoH documentation. DoH confirmed that this referred to the 4% rebate in 
the 2012-2015 agreement and continued in the Agreement. 
f. The first increase occurred from 1 June 2016 to 31 July 2018; the second from 1 August 2018 
to 31 July 2018. 
Source: Based on information provided by the DoH and text. 
Second, the no agreement counterfactual attributes savings to the Agreement which are the 
result, in part at least, of other policy initiatives taken independently of the Agreement (e.g. 
reference pricing which encourages generic firms to come to market sooner rather than 
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later triggering price reductions) or the result of gains made in earlier agreements.  Indeed, 
the 4% rebate goes back to 1969. 
Third, the DoH press release announcing the Agreement is consistent with the view that the 
counterfactual is the status quo, not no agreement. The DoH (2016a) states, for example, 
“The pricing provisions in this agreement represent a significant improvement on those 
contained in the previous agreement.”  In the ‘Notes to Editors’, the press release points out 
the key pricing elements in the Agreement, which highlight the improvements as compared 
with the 2012-2015 agreement. 
Fourth, the Minister for Health stressed that the savings from the Agreement will be used to 
fund new medicines.  It seems reasonable to assume that for budget purposes the HSE 
projects forward based on the status quo.  Any additional savings due to the Agreement are 
then a windfall gain that can be used for new medicines. 
Fifth, it could be argued that the Health Act 2013 provided the HSE with a plausible 
alternative price setting mechanism in the event of a failure of the State and IPHA to reach 
an agreement. However, in this case the appropriate counterfactual is not the no agreement 
counterfactual set out above.  Rather it is the set of pricing rules (or some variant thereof) 
that the HSE threatened to unilaterally impose in May 2016 during the State/IPHA 
negotiations. 
Pricing of New Medicines 
Setting the scene 
Despite the undoubted benefits of the Agreement in terms of savings, it does nothing to 
control the price of new medicines.  As noted above expensive new medicines tend to be 
included in the HTD scheme. The evidence cited above suggests that the HTD has not only 
grown substantially, but also that its outturn consistently exceeds its allocation.165 
Furthermore, “[I]n a no-policy change scenario, there is no sign of cost pressure abating on 
this scheme given the prospective pipeline of new innovative drugs.”166  
                                                     
165
 Callaghan (2015, p. 15) with respect to outturn and allocation. 
166
 Callaghan (2015, p. 15). 
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In the discussion above under ‘Future Policy on Pricing New Medicine’ it was suggested that 
the HSE consider reviewing the appropriate cost-effectiveness threshold for a QALY and 
other related issues in setting the price for a new medicine.  Subsequently, after 
consultation and consistent with the provisions of the Health Act 2013, the HSE could issue 
guidance on the pricing of a new medicine.  This should, for example, set a cost per QALY 
cost-effectiveness threshold and a set of strict conditions, if any, under which this threshold 
can be exceeded. This guidance would, of course, inform the thresholds used in the NCPE’s 
pharmacoeconomic evaluation for the HSE.   
The evidence cited above under ‘Preparations for negotiations with IPHA’ for the UK 
suggests that a €45,000/QALY is on the high side and that a much lower threshold is 
appropriate.  In part the latter threshold is based on more effective healthcare alternatives 
forgone due to the funding of medicines, which is consistent with the 2013 remarks cited of 
the HSE Director-General Designate. Furthermore a recent evaluation of the UK Cancer 
Drugs Fund, set up to fund medicines that did not meet UK cost-effectiveness thresholds, 
found that the Fund “has not delivered meaningful benefits to patients or society.”167    
At the present time the process for setting prices for new medicines, especially for those 
with a cost per QALY above €45,000, lacks predictability and transparency, despite the 
publication of the helpful summaries of the NCPE evaluations which inform the HSE listing 
decision. This decision-making process, as noted above, can lead to situations in which those 
who shout or lobby the loudest and most ably are rewarded.  It puts the HSE in an invidious 
position. 
Guidance and clarity raises the possibility of shielding the HSE at least partially from the 
pressure to add expensive new medicines to the Reimbursement List, while at the same 
time increasing transparency and predictability.  The pressure on the HSE to approve 
expensive new medicines is unlikely to abate, given: the current incentives created by the 
healthcare system; and, the unrealistic expectations raised concerning the funding for new 
medicines based on €600 million of savings attributed to the Agreement.  In reality the 
savings are less than half that amount. 
                                                     
167
 Aggarwal et al (2017, p. 1). 
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The latter point concerning expectations is usefully illustrated with respect to the decision 
to fund Orkambi in May 2017, despite its high QALY and budget impact.168 In defending the 
decision the representative body Cystic Fibrosis Ireland argued that the Government’s 
estimate of the savings due to the Agreement provided the necessary resources for the 
medicine to be added to the Reimbursement List.169 The IPHA (2017) made a similar 
argument in welcoming the decision to fund Orkambi.  To the extent that the no agreement 
counterfactual substantially overstates the savings due to the Agreement the expectations 
of patients are not aligned with the funds available for new medicines. 
Exit vs voice 
In some areas of healthcare in Ireland patients can exercise exit over voice.170 Exit in this 
context means that a patient instead of choosing to change and improve the quality of the 
public healthcare system from within opts instead for private health insurance.171,172  Such a 
choice of exit over voice results in better service for the private patient as long waiting lists 
are avoided.  The patient receives “faster access to the public acute hospital sector” and 
other instances of queue jumping.173  
However, for new medicines there is no private health insurance.  The only option is public 
provision through access to the various community drug schemes, including the HTD.  Hence 
in terms of access to new medicines patients will tend to use voice over exit.  In other 
words, there will be intense lobbying – voice - of the political system to ensure access.174 
Such lobbying is likely to lead to a misallocation of resources, especially since those with 
private health insurance tend come disproportionately from higher socio-economic groups.  
                                                     
168
 See footnote 93 for a discussion on the background concerning the Orkambi decision. 
169
 Watt (2017) used the €750 million figure rather than €600 million.  See footnote 4 above for details. 
170
 This distinction is based on a distinction drawn by Hirschman (1970). 
171
 Around 45% of the population has private health insurance in Ireland, with a concentration in the better off 
socio-economic groups.  For further details see Heath Insurance Authority/MillwardBrown (2016). 
172
 Another example of exit over voice concerns the situations where a patient/consumer receives 
unsatisfactory service or treatment from a medical practitioner such as GP or a pharmacist.  The 
patient/consumer can either switch to another medical practitioner (exit) or complain to the medical 
practitioner’s professional regulatory body (voice).  See Madden & O’Donovan (2015) with respect to 
complaints about doctors. 
173
 Connolly and Wren (2016, p. 2). 
174
 A number of factors are likely to facilitate voice: it is often easy to identify those individuals likely to benefit 
from a particular new medicine; the numbers are often small; and, there incentives are aligned in wanting 
access to the medicine.  
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In other words, at the margin, extra resources will be spent on access to high cost – in terms 
of cost per QALY – new medicines as opposed to other interventions in the healthcare 
system that might well lead to better returns. 
Such a view is consistent with the 2013 letter from the Director-General Designate of the 
HSE to the Minister for Health (cited above) which stated that “a positive reimbursement 
decision [to fund ivacaftor] might ultimately have implications (opportunity costs) for other 
social services which might be provided (including health services).  Some of those other 
health services would be highly cost effective to support.”  
Furthermore there is evidence of long waiting times in Ireland for hip replacement, knee 
replacement and cataract removal all of which have QALY’s well below €45,000.175  While 
the media might be replete with organisations motivated by a desire to access to a new 
medicine, much less attention is paid to those subject to long waiting times for hip and knee 
replacements or cataracts.  
This is not surprising.  Some persons requiring a hip or knee replacement or a cataract 
would have jumped the queue through private health insurance.  Those persons at or near 
the top of the waiting list can expect rapid treatment and hence have little incentive to 
exercise voice. Furthermore of those left on the waiting list there are problems of 
coordination while a solution is not always in sight – at least compared to the decision to 
add a medicine to the Reimbursement List.  
Hence in order to correct the biases inherent in the current method of determining whether 
or not new medicines should be added to the Reimbursement List, the HSE should consider 
developing guidance, paying particular attention to cost-effectiveness thresholds and when 
they might be exceeded, after consultation, in order to ensure greater predictability and 
transparency.176 
                                                     
175
 O’Mahony and Coughlan (2016, p. 8). 
176
 An issue which is beyond the remit of this paper concerns the independence of the HSE.  At the present 
time the HSE reports to the Minister for Health and all the leading HSE executive members are State 
employees.  The current structure of the HSE represents a move to make the HSE more accountable to the 
Minister for Health.  The Board of the HSE was recently abolished and its CEO replaced in pursuit of this 
objective (DoH, 2012). It is intended to abolish the HSE at some point in the future. Making decisions on issues 
such as adding new medicines to the Reimbursement List are often delegated by the State to independent 
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Using Evidence to Inform Policy 
Lunn and Ruane (2013, p. 1) in answering the question of when and how evidence can 
inform policy state, 
“There is a sense in which the answer to this question is obvious. Whatever, 
the policy domain, few would dispute that decision-makers are inclined to 
make better decisions when they have the relevant factual information, 
understand the underlying processes involved, and possess reliable estimates 
of the likely outcomes associated with the options under consideration.” 
DPER and IGEES, as noted above, were created in part to provide the relevant factual 
information and present reliable estimates. 
In the present case suppose it is accepted that the status quo rather than the no agreement 
is the appropriate counterfactual benchmark.  Instead of savings of €600 million attributed 
to the Agreement the sum is €290 million.  How would that affect public policy?  
While it is difficult to be precise, the Minister for Health and other signatories representing 
the State may have decided that savings of €290 million were insufficient.  The 
representatives of the State may have pushed for further concessions from the IPHA. 
Rebates may have been increased. Realignments might have used the lowest price among 
the Nominated States to set the ex-factory price.  The cost per QALY threshold could be set 
well below €45,000.   
Given the asymmetry in access to information it is difficult for those outside the 
negotiations to be able to assess the claims and counterclaims. Often when more 
information becomes available subsequent to decisions having already been made 
entrenched positions have been adopted. Far better the basis on which estimates such as 
the €600 million are made should be published prior to decisions being made so that the 
legislators and civil society can assess and debate the issues.177  Better policy and value for 
money should result. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
regularly bodies (Gorecki, 2011). If the HSE is abolished then some thought might be given to the creation of 
such an independent body.  
177
 For example, as part of DPER/IGEES healthcare papers referred to above. 
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Notwithstanding the lack of documentation concerning the savings flowing from the 
Agreement a forum does exist within which the Agreement can be assessed.  The Joint 
Committee on Health has shown an interest in the cost of prescription medicines. It 
published a report in 2015 on the issue, with recommendations relating to “the inclusion of 
key performance indicators for drug price savings under a new Agreement.”178 It would 
therefore be an appropriate place within which the magnitude of the savings flowing from 
the Agreement could be thoroughly examined.179  
                                                     
178
 Joint Committee on Health & Children, Houses of the Oireachtas (2015, p. 24). 
179
 The committee has not, to date, dealt with the issue of the savings flowing from the Agreement.  In a recent 
examination of the future of healthcare in Ireland by a committee of the Dail, although reference is made to 
the Agreement, the report does not address the effectiveness of the Agreement in terms of cost savings nor 
does it suggest methods of dealing with the ongoing budgetary pressures occasioned by the flow of new 
medicines beyond some general recommendations.  Nevertheless, the committee makes a recommendation 
that is consistent with discussion above in ‘Pricing of New Medicines.’  See Committee on the Future of 
Healthcare (2017, pp. 99-101). 
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